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ABSTRACT
THE SPIRIT OF TECHNOLOGY: A PNEUMATOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOURSE ON TECHNIQUE
Kevin Guenther Trautwein
University of Waterloo and Conrad Grebel University College, 2014
This thesis explores the use of spirit-language in technological discourse in order 
to show that the category of spirit is viable within technological discourse and that spirit-
language can be a new way for theology to engage with technology.
This thesis demonstrates the need for theological engagement with technology, in 
the first place, by surveying the existence of moral evaluations in current popular and 
academic discourse about technique and by citing examples of comparable engagement 
drawn from ethical discourse and from ancient mythologies. Since morality, ethics, and 
mythology traditionally belong to religion and theology, theological engagement with 
technology is warranted. Yet, the current state of theological engagement with technology
is typically cautious. In this context, the recent introduction of spirit-language into 
technological discourse opens up a new and important way for theology to engage 
critically and constructively with technology.
This thesis then surveys the use of spirit-language in technological discourse in 
order to create a context for theological engagement with technology. “Spirit” is 
conceptualized in various and inconsistent ways in technological discourse. The “spirits” 
assumed by technological discourse have religious, ethical, and social consequences. 
Analysis and evaluation of these implicit pneumatologies represent ways for theology to 
critically and constructively engage with technology.
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Yes, I love technology 
But not as much as you, you see 
But I still love technology 
Always and forever 
-- Kip (Napoleon Dynamite)
And the people bowed and prayed
To the neon god they made
And what difference does it make?
I love you so much anyway
And on your breast I gently laid
Your arms surround me in the lake
I am joined with you forever 
-- Sufjan Stevens (All Delighted People)
Technology is basically neutral. It’s kind of like
a hammer. The hammer doesn’t care whether you use
it to build a house, or whether a torturer uses it
to crush somebody’s skull.
-- Noam Chomsky (The Purpose of Education)
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INTRODUCTION
What is technology? How does technology shape our lives, and what does 
theology have to say about it? The phenomenon of technique itself is a simple unity 
which is nevertheless multifaceted and complex. Unfortunately, the scholarly discourse 
about technique is contested and sometimes unclear, and here theology shares some of 
the blame. Conceptualizing the complexity and the unity of technique (not to mention the
external context) simultaneously is quite difficult. It is easier, in the short term, to address
technique in its individual instances, rather than to conceptualize technique as a 
phenomenon. Yet it is precisely this ability to hold the complexity and the unity of 
technique in balance that is required of theology if theology is to have a relevant, critical, 
and ultimately hopeful word for people. Only then can theology address the ongoing 
concerns that people have about technique as they experience it: technique that operates 
in mundane and ubiquitous devices, but also in systemic and embedded structures.
So then, why theology? The choice to analyze technique from a theological 
perspective rather than from some other perspective, say, political or economic, is not 
arbitrary. Historically, religious worldviews have effectively marked out the domain of 
the technical and the non-technical, while in modern times the expansion of technique 
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into domains previously considered sacred has been linked to developments in Christian 
theology. In particular, a robust concept of spirit has been linked with successful 
limitation of technique in the past, while conversely the exponential growth of technique 
in Western cultures has been linked to a worldview which severely limits the role of spirit
in the world. These are good reasons to explore a connection between spirit and 
technique, and yet there is at least one basic question which stands as a problem: what 
does religion have to do with the arts and crafts?
Theological thinking about technique has often been limited by a lack of 
appropriate categories for analyzing technique. The most common categories in use by 
theology today are incarnation and creation or co-creation. Yet, after more than a century 
of demythologizing at the hands of materialist epistemology, the concept of spirit is 
making a comeback in the broader discourse about technique itself. So the category of 
spirit offers a new avenue for theology to enter into the discourse about technique. But 
what is that spirit? Does it bear any relation to the traditional Christian understanding of 
the Spirit of God? How should Christian pneumatology think about this spirit?
In this thesis, I argue that Christian pneumatology can shape modern thinking 
about technique by engaging with the spirit language in technological discourse. By 
focusing on spirit, I believe that theology can get at the heart or essence of technique, 
even while it brings the resources of systematic pneumatology to the table. This work 
lays a foundation for future conversation between theology and technology.
Chapter 1 introduces the methodological issues that are relevant for my discussion
of the spirit of technology. I begin with a short discussion of theology as grammar. 
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Language and grammar are key to this project, focused as it is on the use of spirit-
language in the discourse about technique. I then offer a discussion of the terms 
“technique” and “technology,” which will be helpful to the reader for understanding the 
use of the terms throughout this project. The dispute around terminology is unusually 
significant in the discourse about technique, and it is standard to find this discussion in 
cursory form at the beginning of any writing on technique. To summarize, I will be using 
“technique” to refer to rational means – art, craft, skill – and I will be using “technology” 
to refer to the discourse about technique – in the same way that “biology” refers to the 
discourse about living things. Finally, because various terms and capitalizations for spirit 
have been freighted with theological significance, I explain how I will be using “spirit.”
Chapter 2 explores the moral significance of the discourse about technique and 
the need for deeper theological engagement. I begin by discussing some of the ways that 
technique is being understood in popular culture. This, for me, is the most important 
reason for theology to begin to grapple with technique, because it shows an area of life 
that matters a great deal to many people, but where they are not receiving sufficient 
guidance by theology. I move from popular culture to academic literature to show that the
issues are not settled there either. I then refer to ethics as an example of the most 
significant kinds of theological engagement with technique that are currently taking 
place. Finally, I introduce some older cosmological perspectives as an example of 
theological, and in particular pneumatological, grappling with technique.
Having laid out a case for theological engagement with the discourse about 
technique, in the second part of chapter 2 I survey the types of theological engagement 
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with technique. The two broad traditions are summarized as describing and imagining. 
My critique is that the describing tradition, though it is critical, tends to lack constructive 
and compelling myths or a prescriptive element, while the imagining tradition is 
prescriptive and mythological, but tends to be insufficiently critical of technique.
Chapter 3 begins to open up new avenues into a theological discussion of 
technique. I survey the use of spirit-language in four discourses: religion-and-science, 
ecology, social criticism, and technology proper. These discourses are technological 
because they discuss technique, but, except for the last, they are not technology proper 
because they are primarily concerned with other issues. Yet these discussions have 
important implications for the discourse about technique. For the purposes of this project,
the way in which spirit-language is used in these discourses reveals an implied 
pneumatology which can be discussed by theology.
Chapter 4 sets up a comparison between biblical pneumatology and the implied 
pneumatologies of technological discourse. Points of conversation include the 
materialism of spirit, the personality of spirit, empiricism as a religious perspective, 
pluralism as a religious perspective, the immanence and transcendence of spirit, and the 
role of unity and difference as they relate to sympathetic and critical perspectives on 
technique. Along the way, biblical pneumatology is read back into technological 
pneumatologies in order to produce a theological criticism.
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CHAPTER 1:
METHODOLOGY
Before I set out, three methodological issues need to be addressed. The first is the 
question of what kind of project this is going to be. Throughout this work, I approach 
theology as grammar, and so I focus on the use of words and language about technique 
rather than on the phenomenon of technical devices themselves. Because I am 
approaching theology as grammar, the second two issues have to do with word usage. In 
the first case, I argue for a disciplined used of “technique,” “technology,” and “device.” 
In the second case, I make a pragmatic choice to remain neutral with reference to the 
words “spirit,” “Spirit,” “The Spirit,” “Spirit of God,” “The Holy Spirit,” etc.
THEOLOGY AS GRAMMAR
Throughout this project, the focus is on the use of language, but why? Ever since 
René Descartes and the Enlightenment, thinking about the relationship between mind and
matter (and, by implication, between spirit and technical devices) has followed what 
Gilbert Ryle characterized as “the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine.”1 As Ryle saw it, 
the relationship between mind and matter was being unnecessarily confused by 
philosophers because of a failure to recognize the categorical differences between mind 
1 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 5–8.
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and matter – a category mistake caused by asking the wrong questions. Even earlier, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein challenged philosophers to pay attention to the use of ordinary 
language as a way of solving philosophical problems.2 Though Wittgenstein has been 
critiqued for disregarding traditional methods of inquiry and perhaps for 
oversimplification, language theory is beginning to shape many fields of academic 
discourse. Together, the insights of Ryle and Wittgenstein indicate that the language 
about technique and the categories that are used matter.3
The relationship of theology (the discourse about God or religion) to technology 
(the discourse about the arts and crafts) is a problem. As a way into this problem, I intend
to follow Wittgenstein's impulse, as developed by postliberal theologians George 
Lindbeck, Paul Holmer, and Hans Frei, of theology as grammar.4 Wittgenstein's proposal 
is based on the observation that the word “God” is used in a particular and unique way. 
William H. Brenner helpfully summarizes the point:
I learned that “God sees me” and “God rewards me” did not have the same
consequences as “Aunt Martha sees and rewards me.” I learned that 
religious people speak of God’s seeing and rewarding when nobody is 
around to observe them and no reward is expected. I learned that one does 
not speak of God’s help as the result of identifying somebody, some 
helper.5
For Wittgenstein, theology is not an empirical science of God, but rather a discussion 
about the grammatical rules (doctrines) that govern the word “God” in everyday speech 
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).
3 For a recent example, see the study by Craig Palmer et al., who argue that the important thing about 
magic, and indeed all religious behaviour, is communication rather than belief in supernatural 
phenomena, and that this communication produces social change, specifically cooperation. Craig T. 
Palmer et al., ‘The Importance of Magic to Social Relationships’, Zygon 45, no. 2 (2010): 317–37.
4 Craig A. Phillips, ‘Postmodernism’, ed. Erwin Fahlbusch et al., trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, The 
Encyclopedia of Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), 301.
5 William H. Brenner, ‘Theology as Grammar’, The Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (1996): 442.
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and practice. As with learning grammar, theology is not done for its own sake, but in 
order to structure behaviour. Moreover, just as the rules of grammar may differ between 
communities, the way in which the word “God” is used belongs to the particular 
community using the word – in this case, members of the Christian religion.6
If theology is grammar in the sense that it is the discourse that “structures 
thoughts and expressions about God and other metaphysical concepts by means of 
language,”7 then an analysis of the use of spirit-language in technology is an attempt to 
identify and clarify the implicit theology operative within those discourses. As I show, 
spirit-language is already being used by technology in particular ways and with a 
particular grammar. A comparison of the uses of spirit-language reveals the features of 
that grammar that so often remain assumed and unnoticed. I believe that it is important to
understand the implicit pneumatologies in these discourses – not simply so that we can 
better understand technique, but because these pneumatologies, once established by 
technology, extend beyond technology into the rest of our theology and shape our very 
lives.
As with any language, theological language is shaped by its use as much or more 
than by its formal rules. Linguistic stability is a fiction. Languages are always in flux, and
the grammar is constantly changing. Though grammatical rules and dictionaries are often 
presented as prescriptive, they are in fact merely descriptive of the present use and 
origins of language. This is not to say that the prescriptive aspect of grammar is 
irrelevant: the prescriptive and descriptive aims of grammar are dialectical, and both 
6 Ibid., 452.
7 Phillips, ‘Postmodernism’, 301.
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function to clarify assumptions and to enable communication, if only by enabling an 
asymptotic approximation of meaning among interlocutors.
Given that the use of language is at least as important as its formal rules, it should 
be clear that the use of implicit pneumatologies (descriptive) in technology will have an 
effect on pneumatology proper (prescriptive). The cumulative effect of the use of spirit-
language in technology changes how spirit is conceptualized in culture as a whole. 
Furthermore, the evolution of the concept of spirit will result in further changes to the 
structure of the “thoughts and expressions about God and other metaphysical concepts”8 
– concepts such as human destiny, a sense of purpose, or the possibility of freedom. So 
the use of spirit-language in technology is not simply a curiosity for philosophers and 
theologians, it can be a handle for the kinds of changes to metaphysical understandings 
that are taking place globally. Technology matters to theology because technology alters 
the grammar of “spirit,” and in so doing it makes theological propositions about issues of 
ultimate importance. So then, my theological analysis of technology will not attempt to 
explain technique in a quasi-scientific manner (religious rather than empirical) but rather 
will identify the conditions for placing technology within the discourse about God. It is 
my hope that, once placed within a theological narrative, the spirit-language in 
technology will be controlled by the grammar of that narrative, i.e., by pneumatology.
DEFINING “TECHNOLOGY” AND “TECHNIQUE”
Defining “technology” is a difficult problem. In the modern world, “technology” 
has become something of a catch-all term; almost anything can be described as 
8 Ibid.
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technology. This demonstrates the power that the discourse about technique has over our 
collective imagination, but it also functions to make serious analysis of technique more 
difficult. The power to define “technique” or “technology” includes the ability to 
determine what “counts” and “doesn't count,” and so to include or exclude those aspects 
that support one's agenda. Without a serious analysis of the definitions of “technique” and
“technology,” much of the discourse is set before the conversation has even begun.
“Technology” and “Technique”
In technical discourse, the two main terms used are “technology” and “technique,”
though terms such as “thing,” “device,” “instrument,” “paradigm” or “socio-technical 
system” are sometimes used for the sake of greater precision. “Technology” and 
“technique” are used quite differently in common language and in academic discourse. 
Looking at both languages can be useful, however, in giving shape to what is meant by 
the terms.
In popular use
At a popular level, the words, “technology” and “technique,” have a broad range 
of uses. “Technology” will most often refer to a type of device or tool, although complex 
gadgets such as computers or automobiles usually come to mind first. The phrase, “I love
technology,” actually means “I love gadgets.” Typically, these are computerized, modern 
gadgets. Nevertheless, most people will agree that mundane objects like paper or dishes 
are also a form of “technology.” As the definition of “technology” is pressed, however, 
the word begins to describe not only these objects, but also the processes by which they 
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are created. We intuit that possessing a particular technology may not mean possessing 
an object, but rather the means (both mental and physical) to produce the technological 
object. For example, a nation will be said to possess nuclear technology if its technicians 
have the scientific knowledge and infrastructure (i.e., the means) to build nuclear devices,
whether or not that nation actually possesses such nuclear devices presently. Finally, in 
common usage, technology can be a cultural attribute. Cultural phenomena like the radio
or the entertainment industry known as “Hollywood” can be described as cultural 
technology.9 This use of “technology” generally works on the level of civilizations, so 
that a historian might say that printing press technology changed European civilization. 
By this use of “technology,” the historian does not mean merely the labour saving device 
of the printing press, but the larger cultural development of mass communication entailed
by the printing press’ ability to reproduce information quickly and reliably. So when 
someone speaks of “nuclear technology” they may be referring to the hardware of a 
nuclear device, to the technical knowledge and infrastructure required to build such a 
device, or to the socio-cultural implications of nuclear devices as a symbol. In this way, 
the word “technology” blurs the boundaries between knowledge, material, and symbol. 
Yet this blurring is instructive, for in a technological milieu there is a strong impetus for 
all knowledge to become applied knowledge, and for knowledge that cannot be applied to
lose value. Thus, in a technological milieu, there is no need to distinguish between 
capability and actuality, or between potential and realized. Anything that is “real” can – 
and will – be done.
In contrast to these broad uses of “technology” in popular culture, the word 
9 Willem B. Drees, ‘Religion In an Age of Technology’, Zygon 37, no. 3 (2002): 599–600. 
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“technique” is usually used more narrowly and refers to something more intangible like 
“skill” or “method.” When “technique” is understood as “skill” or “method,” it overlaps 
significantly with the second use of “technology” that I explored above – “technology” as
a process. However, the word technique is not simply a specific word for the general 
category of technology-as-process. In common parlance, there is technique that is not 
assimilable to technology-as-process. This is because, as a general rule, “technology” has
to do with the manufacturing process and/or the manipulation of natural objects. So, for 
example, a marathon runner's technology would include things like shoes, clothing, and 
hydration equipment, but the runner's technique would refer to the way in which she 
moves her legs and arms, controls her breathing, holds her head, etc. This use for 
“technique” would never be confused with “technology,” even though both “technique” 
and “technology-as-process” refer primarily to “means.” What this demonstrates is that, 
in popular discourse, “technique” is more than just a term for “technology-as-process.” 
There is overlap, but not complete subsumption.
In academic use
Within academic discourse, the terminology is also unsettled. The study of 
technique takes places within a range of disciplines, involving scientists, engineers, 
economists, sociologists, historians, and philosophers (to name a few). Some fields use 
the word “technology” in a very precise and restricted way, while others use the word in 
more inclusive or abstracted ways. In general, disciplines whose scope is more focused 
(like science and engineering) tend to use the word, “technology.” However, disciplines 
whose purview is more broad (like sociology and philosophy) have developed a range of 
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terms to describe the different aspects of “technology” that come into view. Instead of 
“technology,” terms like “hardware,” “artifact,” “knowledge,” “technique,” “method,” or 
“socio-technical system” are often used and help to make important distinctions.10
Yet the question remains: what is the thing being studied? Is the object under 
scrutiny “technology” or “technique”? Within the disciplines of the physical sciences and
engineering, the standard answer is “technology.” Engineers study technology in order to 
build technology and use technology. For these disciplines, the analysis of technology is 
primarily “internal,” that is, they are interested in the efficiency, proper functioning, or 
immediate use of the device internal to itself.11 Within the disciplines of the social 
sciences and the arts, the answer is more likely to be “technique.” Sociologists want to 
understand what effect technique is having on families, communities, or society. Yet even
this bifurcation is somewhat simplistic. There is a further divide between social scientists 
in Europe and those in North America. Canadian social philosopher George Grant 
observed that, “In distinction from the usage in English of 'technology' and 'technologies,'
the Europeans have generally used 'technique' and 'techniques,' the former for the whole 
array of means for making events happen, the latter for the particular means.”12 So, even 
in the social sciences, the use of “technique” or “technology” is determined for the most 
part by the accident of a European or a North American cultural context. Why is this?
The difference between the North American and European choice of terms can be 
10 Stephen J. Kline, ‘What Is Technology?’, Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society 5, no. 3 (1985): 
215–217.
11 The term “internalist” comes from Staudenmaier's discussion of internalist history, which, “is 'internal' 
history because the focus of attention is centred almost completely on the artifact itself rather than on 
how the artifact relates to its external social context.” John Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers: 
Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), 9.
12 George Grant, Technology and Justice (Toronto, ON: Anansi, 1986), 11.
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partially explained by differences in language as well as the historical development of 
words. For example, in modern French, technique roughly translates as English 
“technology,” and can be used in many of the same ways as the English word.13 On the 
other hand, French technologie refers to a systematic discourse or study about 
technique.14 Finally, the phrase arts et métiers, literally translated “arts and crafts” or 
“arts and trades,” is also associated with technology, but refers only to applied arts and 
skills.15 It functions more like the English word, “engineering.”16 For various reasons, the 
English word “technology” developed along different lines than technologie, resulting in 
different terminological preferences. Eric Schatzberg locates the source of this 
metamorphosis in German debates concerning die Technik, and the way in which 
“technic” was brought into English in the twentieth century.17 These observations offer an
explanation for the differences based upon historical accident, but the differences are now
deeper than divergent etymology.18
Another important difference between European and North American scholarship 
is the scope of study that is attempted. While North American scholars tend to limit their 
studies to the effects of a particular “technology” upon a discreet area of life (e.g., Paul 
Lazarsfeld's study of the effects of television on children19), European scholars are more 
13 Michela Clari and Martyn Back, eds., ‘Technique’, Collins Robert French Dictionary (Glasgow: 
HarperCollins Publishers & Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2004), 521; Kline, ‘What Is Technology?’, 216.
14 Stephen V. Monsma, Responsible Technology: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1986), 11; Grant, Technology and Justice, 11.
15 Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11.
16 On the connection between technique and engineering, see Donald S. L. Cardwell, ‘Problems of the 
Data Base’, in The History and Philosophy of Technology, ed. George Bugliarello and Dean B. Doner 
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 4.
17 Eric Schatzberg, ‘“Technik” Comes to America: Changing Meanings of “Technology” before 1930’, 
Technology and Culture 47, no. 3 (July 2006): 488–496.
18 Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11; Kline, ‘What Is Technology?’, 216.
19 Paul F. Lazarsfeld, ‘Why Is So Little Known About the Effects of Television on Children and What Can
Be Done?’, Public Opinion Quarterly 19, no. 3 (1955): 243–51.
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inclined to a systemic analysis of “technique” on society as a whole (best exemplified by 
Jacques Ellul, but also seen in the neo-Marxist critiques of Jürgen Habermas and Herbert 
Marcuse).20 Within academic literature, then, the choice of “technique” or “technology” 
can signify an approach to the study itself – either broad and systemic, or narrow and 
isolated.
Definitional Strategies
Modern English deals with the ambiguity of the word, “technology,” in a variety 
of ways. In her survey of current approaches, Susan White includes a note distinguishing 
between those that focus on “technological hardware” and those that focus on a 
“technological worldview.”21 John Staudenmaier's study discerns a difference between 
inclusive, systemic studies of technology in Europe and narrowly focused studies of 
particular technology in North America.22 Carl Mitcham, summarizing the various 
approaches to a history of technology, finds three types: 1) a “technological history,” 
which is the history of hardware; 2) a “social history of technology,” which is the history 
of the effects of that hardware on society, and 3) a “history of ideas about technology,” 
which is the history of human perceptions about the various hardware.23 Each of these 
authors' broad classifications can be seen as an attempt to create a handle for 
understanding technology as a process or device vis-à-vis technology as a systematic 
20 Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers, 10.
21 Susan J. White, Christian Worship and Technological Change (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994), 
132 n10.
22 Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers, 10.
23 Carl Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, in The History and Philosophy of 
Technology, ed. George Bugliarello and Dean B. Doner (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1979), 
167.
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discourse. These classifications could be greatly simplified by a discerning use of the 
terms “technology” and “technique.”
Etymology of “technology”
Etymologically, “technic” is an adjective for anything “pertaining to art or an art.”
“Technique” is the “manner of artistic execution,” while “technology” is a “scientific 
study of the arts” or “technical terminology.”24 “Technology” is an adaptation from the 
Greek word, technologia, a combination of techne (art, skill, craft, method, system) + 
logia (words, discourse), which originally meant a “systematic treatment of an art, craft, 
or technique.”25 In particular, technologia was first used in Aristotle's Rhetoric with 
reference to a systematic discourse (logia) about (word)craft (techne) including grammar,
rhetoric, etc.26
The modern English word, “technique,” derives from Greek techne, through 
French technique, which has both adjectival and nominal uses. The French adjective 
technique has the sense of “technical,” and in its modern nominal use la technique can be
translated as “technique” (method) or as “technology.”27 The former sense is preserved in 
the modern English definition of “technique” as:
Manner of artistic execution or performance in relation to formal or 
practical details (as distinct from general effect, expression, sentiment, 
etc.); the mechanical or formal part of an art, esp. of any of the fine arts; 
the manner of execution or performance in any discipline, profession, or 
sport; also, skill or ability in the department of one's art; mechanical skill 
in artistic or technical work (freq. used without article or qualifying word).
24 C. T. Onions, G. W. S. Friedrichsen, and R. W. Burchfield, eds., ‘Technic’, The Oxford Dictionary of 
English Etymology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 906.
25 Ibid. See also Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11.
26 Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, 183; Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11.
27 Clari and Back, ‘Technique’, 521. 
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loosely, a skilful or efficient means of achieving a purpose; a characteristic
way of proceeding; a knack, a trick.28
“Technique,” defined in these ways, encompasses many of the concepts that I earlier 
grouped under the umbrella of technology-as-process.
Prior to the twentieth century, the English word “technology” basically agreed 
with its French and German counterparts to mean, “1) the arts of language – that is, 
grammar; 2) the discourse or description of the arts; and 3) the terminology of a 
particular art or the arts in general (as used here, art includes both the fine and 
mechanical arts).”29 In the twentieth century, however, the meaning of the term evolved 
from a discourse on the arts in general to the mechanical arts in particular, after which it 
took on the additional meaning of the practice of the mechanical arts. 
Using a term that in the original Greek had referred to the systematic use 
or 'crafting' of words to refer to the systematic 'crafting' of the physical 
world reflects the fact that Galileo, Descartes, and other seventeenth-
century thinkers had led their age to think in terms of dominating and 
manipulating nature.30
According to an etymological strategy then, “technology” should be used 
exclusively for the discourse or study of technique, and “technique” should be used to 
refer to an art, craft, skill, or method. Furthermore, both of these are distinguished from 
the products of an art or craft (i.e., artifact, hardware, device).
“Technology” as neologism
Etymology notwithstanding, most North American scholars accept the common 
28 J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner, eds., ‘Technique’, The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 704.
29 Schatzberg, ‘“Technik” Comes to America’, 489. See also Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of 
Technology’, 184; Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11.
30 Monsma, Responsible Technology, 11.
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usage of “technology” as a fait accompli, while some actively seek to defend it. There are
indeed some good reasons for accepting the neologism of “technology.” The first and 
most obvious one is simply for convenience. Established usage in North America prefers 
“technology,” and it is very difficult to change the definition of a word once established. 
Furthermore, using a word in idiosyncratic ways can detract from the accessibility of an 
argument. Therefore, it is usually best to use a word in its most typical sense, unless there
are strong reasons against this.
The second reason for accepting the popular definition of “technology” has to do 
with the very novelty of the word. Perhaps the boldest justification for “technology” is 
put forward by Grant. While acknowledging the divide between American and European 
use of “technology” and “technique,” he argues that “technology” is actually a highly 
appropriate word. For Grant, “technology” fittingly conveys the novelty of hybridity in 
the modern era between the sciences and the arts.
When “technology” is used to describe the actual means of making events 
happen, and not simply the systematic study of these means, the word 
reveals to us the fact that these new events happen because we westerners 
willed to develop a new and unique co-penetration of the arts and sciences,
a co-penetration which has never before existed. What is given in the 
neologism – consciously or not – is the idea that modern civilisation is 
distinguished from all previous civilisations because our activities of 
knowing and making have been brought together in a way which does not 
allow the once-clear distinguishing of them. In fact, the coining of the 
word “technology” catches the novelty of that co-penetration of knowing 
and making. It also implies that we have brought the sciences and the arts 
into a new unity in our will to be the masters of the earth and beyond.31
Furthermore, Grant suggests that the novelty expressed by the word “technology” is the 
distinguishing feature of modern civilization. The difference between modern 
31 Grant, Technology and Justice, 12.
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“technology” and Greek techne is not simply a matter of scale or of relative efficiency; it 
is an ontological difference, with a reconfigured relationship between knowledge and 
power.32 From this perspective, the word “technology” is not merely a grammatical 
accident, but is an apt expression of the fundamental change that has taken place.
One problem with Grant's approach to the problem of terminology is that 
“technology” was used in pre-modern times (e.g., Greek technologia, French 
technologie). To be clear, Grant's usage would strictly require that we never refer to 
“technology” in pre-industrial societies, since “technology” by his definition is modern. 
But, given that the word did exist in pre-industrial societies, there would need to be a way
for historians, at least, to use the word in its pre-modern contexts. This would require 
careful nuance in order to differentiate ancient “technology” as a “discourse about an art”
from the modern sense of “technology” as the “co-penetration of sciences and arts.”
In addition, Grant's proposal is based on the assumption that the co-penetration of 
knowing and making, expressed in the neologism “technology,” is fundamentally novel. 
However, this assumption is itself one of the issues under debate within the philosophy of
technology. It may be the case that technique has always involved such a co-penetration 
of knowing and making (contra Grant), in which case the novelty of modern times is not 
this relationship, but its transgression of traditional boundaries.33 This argument has been 
advanced by Ellul and explored in detail by Gregory Davis.34
32 Ibid., 12–14, 32.
33 Carl Mitcham suggests that this is a result of the view of matter as something inert rather than as 
something which has its own purpose and is in some sense “alive.” See Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the 
History of Technology’, 186.
34 Gregory Davis, Means Without End: A Critical Survey of the Ideological Genealogy of Technology 
Without Limits, from Apollonian Techne to Postmodern Technoculture (Lanham, MD: University Press 
of America, 2006); Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York, NY: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1976), 27–29.
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Levels of “technology”
Another way in which the ambiguity of “technology” is explained is through a 
heuristic of levels. Willem Drees has identified four levels on which we can experience 
and discuss technology. The first level, that of material manifestations, consists of 
devices (e.g., a mobile phone) and the infrastructure (e.g., radio transmission towers) in 
which such devices are embedded. These material manifestations interface with 
technology on the social level. That is, they involve a social system (e.g., the phone 
system) which requires certain skills (e.g., the operation of mobile phones, mobile phone 
repair, radio tower maintenance). The third level is psychological. At this level, 
technology consists of certain technological attitudes (e.g., the expectation of immediate 
contact with others). All of this is experienced in the context of the fourth layer: culture.35
Technology is not a separate segment of our lives, but it pervades and 
shapes our lives. It is the world in which we live. Antibiotics, sewage 
systems, contraceptive pills, refrigerators, and central heating systems are 
more than new means. Antibiotics and sewage systems changed our sense 
of vulnerability (limiting enormously the number of parents who had to 
bury their own infants). The pill changed relations between men and 
women and between parents and their children. Thanks to the refrigerator 
and the microwave we can eat whenever it suits us, individually, and each 
according to his or her taste, and thus the common meal as a major 
characteristic of the day has lost significance. Central heating has made the
common room with the fireplace less important; we can each spend our 
time in our own rooms in the way we like. Technology makes life easier 
and more attractive; music is available without effort on my part, except 
for switching on the stereo.36
The use of levels helps Drees explain the range of concepts to which “technology” can 
refer. Following this strategy, definitions of “technology” are usually stated in the 
broadest terms possible, with the aim of adequately accounting for the phenomena 
35 Drees, ‘Religion In an Age of Technology’, 599–600.
36 Ibid., 600.
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included under the term “technology” and at the same time differentiating technology 
from other aspects of human experience.
Differentiating “Technology” and “Technique”
Given the discussion above, in this paper I reserve the word “technology” for the 
systematic discourse about technique, where “technique” refers to skills and rational 
methods (i.e., the applied arts and crafts). I accept that a major disadvantage to this 
approach is the easy confusion between this highly specific definition and its more 
typical use by scholars and in popular discourse. Nevertheless, the advantages seem 
greater: higher differentiation between terms should contribute to the perspicuity of my 
argument.
The choice to limit the use of “technology” to “the study of technique” clarifies 
because it maintains the difference between the study of a rational method, art, or craft (in
which there is some degree of separation) and the practice of that rational method, art, or 
craft (which is immediate). Returning to Aristotle's use of technologia, we can easily 
discern the difference between studying rhetoric and using rhetoric (even though Aristotle
may have used rhetoric as a tool for teaching rhetoric). Similarly, by reserving the word 
“technology” for the discourse about technique, I am better able to distinguish between 
the use of technique and the discourse about technique.
Secondly, though I began by differentiating “technology” (as process) from 
technique, perhaps the more common mistake today is to use “technology” with reference
to the instruments of technique, or to the outcomes of technique. Here also, the limited 
use of “technology” maintains the difference between the systematic study of a rational 
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method and the tools or outcomes of that rational method. Consider three examples:
1. Levers. In the case of moving a boulder, it is easy to differentiate between the 
rational method (technique), the tool, and the outcome of that method. Using a lever is 
the rational method (technique) for lifting a heavy object. The lever is the tool, and the 
displacement of the object is the outcome. (The technique here can also be differentiated 
from non-technique: brute force exerted by pushing on the boulder.) The study or 
discourse of the workings of levers is lever technology.
2. Rhetoric. In the case of speech, rhetoric is the technique – a rational means of 
persuasion. Words are the tools of rhetoric, while persuasion or action is the outcome of 
the technique. (Again, the technique here can be differentiated from non-technique. It is 
possible to compel a listener to action without a rational procedure, e.g., by yelling, but 
this would not be considered rhetoric.) The study of rhetoric is technology. This is indeed
the original sense of Aristotle's technologia.
3. Computers. In the case of computers, computing is the technique (i.e., art or 
craft). It is considered to be the most rational method for achieving various ends.37 The 
computer is the tool, and, while there are many different eventual outcomes (e.g., the 
solution to the equation or the written book), the output to peripheral devices (monitor, 
printer, etc.) is the immediate outcome.38 The study of computing is computer 
technology.
37 Although it could be argued that the possible goals of computing are much more diverse than those of 
levers and rhetoric, it is still a single technique in that working with digital information is chosen as the 
“best” (most efficient, or most rational) method for solving advanced mathematical problems, writing a 
book, etc.
38  The confusion around the language of “computer technology” is particularly problematic because of 
our heightened awareness that the computer itself is the product of other (manufacturing) techniques, 
many of which are themselves computerized. This is why identifying the outcome and the tool is so 
important.
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These three examples suggest another important advantage to the use of carefully 
differentiated terms. The use of “technology” purely for “the discourse about technique” 
provides the conceptual tools to think about such a discourse, and even possibly to 
critique it. Differentiation allows us to critique, for example, the discourse about levers, 
without necessarily critiquing their use. Or it may be the case that someone is less 
concerned with the discourse and study of rhetoric in general, but would like to evaluate 
Aristotle’s particular technologia. Today, we are well acquainted with computerized 
devices, and we have difficulty seeing them as anything other than neutral tools. Perhaps 
this is because we generally have no word for “the discourse about computers,” and so 
we are ill-suited to think about such a discourse, let alone to evaluate it.39
A NOTE ON SPIRIT/SPIRIT
The use of the term “spirit,” with or without capitalization and/or the definite 
article, has become theologically and politically significant. George Tinker draws 
attention to the political significance of capitalization in general in his book, Spirit and 
Resistance, where he chooses to capitalize “White” but not “european” or “american.”40 
Kirsteen Kim's book, The Holy Spirit in the World, specifically addresses the divisiveness
of different concepts of spirit – as well as their potential to unify – beginning with an 
anecdote about the controversy surrounding the opening event for the World Council of 
39 The word “discourse” here is crucial, because we do in fact have a term for a very limited “study” of 
computers: computer engineering. What is included under engineering, however, is much narrower than
the type of discourse involved in “technology.” Engineering is focused solely on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of computers. Computer technology as a discourse would include engineering, but it would 
also include broader discussions about the general usefulness of computers, the ways in which they 
could be used in the future, the social benefits and drawbacks of computers, etc.
40 For an explanation, see George E. Tinker, Spirit and Resistance: Political Theology and American 
Indian Liberation (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2004), xi–xii.
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Churches (1991) at the Canberra Assembly, the theme of which was “Come, Holy Spirit, 
renew the whole creation.”41 The controversy was caused by the fact that understandings 
of the relationship of the Holy Spirit to spirit and spirituality vary significantly 
throughout global Christianity. The Orthodox churches 
expressed “alarm” at a lack of discernment in affirming the presence of the
Spirit in human movements, without regard for sin and error; and they 
stressed the need to “guard against a tendency to substitute a 'private' 
spirit, the spirit of the world, or other spirits for the Holy Spirit” (italics 
original).42
Evangelical churches had similar concerns, specifically raising “the question of whether 
the Holy Spirit could be considered to be at work in the whole creation” and also 
questions about “syncretism.”43 Kim goes on to explore the many ways in which spirit is 
understood globally. In Western modernity, for example, “Cultural understanding of 
“spirit” is linked with pixies, fairies and demons in the fantasy world of wizards and 
witches”; however, in post-modernity and especially New Age spirituality, “'spirit' has 
become a catchword for marketing anything cool – including cigarettes, clothing, health 
cures – and 'spirituality' is a politically correct means of self-expression.”44 Traditional 
Korean, Indian, and North American Indigenous cultures have their own pneumatologies.
Historically, the Holy Spirit has been neglected by theology, which turns discussions of 
the Holy Spirit into discussions of the Church. As a result, the various understandings of 
“spirit,” globally and theologically, call up different concepts: personal “ghosts,” forces 
in nature and in human institutions, superstition, or the embodiment of Life (just to name 
41 Kirsteen Kim, The Holy Spirit in the World: A Global Conversation (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
2007), viii–xiv.
42 Ibid., ix.
43 Ibid., x.
44 Ibid., 1–2.
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a few).
Out of sensitivity to this issue, throughout this work I intentionally use the term 
“spirit” – lowercase, without the definite article – unless the context explicitly refers to 
the Spirit of God. My intention for this word usage is to remain as neutral as possible on 
the various pneumatologies. Furthermore, I use the term “Spirit of God,” rather than 
“Holy Spirit,” which is traditionally associated with the Church, in order to suspend 
evaluation on the issue of the presence of the Spirit of God in the world. This thesis 
draws on a wide range of thinkers, from within and outside the Christian tradition, and it 
is not always clear how these thinkers conceptualize spirit. Indeed, even if it were 
possible to coherently map each concept of spirit, the terminology would soon become 
too unwieldy to use. Instead, I have chosen to focus on technology and leave the question
of spirit for another project.
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CHAPTER 2:
WHAT HAS ATHENS TO DO WITH JERUSALEM? A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON 
TECHNOLOGY AND THEOLOGY
At first glance, theology and technology do not seem to have very much in 
common. In a kind of “two kingdoms” theology, technology seems to deal with the 
physical world, while theology deals with the spiritual. Yet, as we will see, theology and 
even pneumatology have a long history of engaging technology, but this engagement is 
often underrepresented or forgotten. Likewise, there are many examples of spirit-
language in technology, which I will discuss in the next chapter. But before we examine 
the implicit pneumatology of technology, it will be important to have a context for the 
relationship between technology and theology in general. Theology and technology 
overlap in more than just their use of spirit-language. They both speak about the imago 
Dei, human origins and destiny, incarnation, and responsibility for creation, to name just 
a few regions of shared concern. In this chapter, I hope to give some shape to the 
landscape of this discourse, which will provide a context for the pneumatology of 
technology.
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I show that 
technology is theologically significant. Both morality and ethics are theological 
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discourses, even when they operate in a popular or secular sphere. Therefore, I begin by 
examining popular ethical evaluations of technical systems and devices. This is followed 
by a survey of some ethical and moral evaluations in academia, especially sociology and 
philosophy. Moving into the religious sphere, I cite some moral and ethical evaluations of
technical development by religion-based social critics. Finally, I explore the evaluation of
technique in ancient Greek mythology and philosophy. The purpose, assuming morality 
and ethics to be (at minimum) theological, is to demonstrate that there is indeed a 
demand for theological engagement with technology, and that this demand is not merely 
the invention of theologians themselves.
In the second section of this chapter, I survey the main ways in which theology 
has engaged with technology thus far. The two main ways have been descriptive and 
imaginative. In its descriptive mode, theology accepts technical developments as one of 
the conditions of the environment in which theology must operate, and so technique is 
allowed to “frame” society. It matters little if theology goes on to critique particular 
aspects of a technological society if technique remains the frame. In its imaginative 
mode, theology grapples more deeply with the significance of technical culture itself, 
especially in terms of participation with God, eschatological hope, and the imago Dei. 
However, the imaginative mode tends to overlook present-day difficulties with technique 
and the possibility that they may be reproduced in the techniques of the future.
THE THEOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF TECHNOLOGY
Why should we think theologically about the discourse on technique? Would it 
not be more important to understand and speak theologically about technique itself, to 
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perhaps make some constructive evaluations of specific technical devices?45 The 
discourse about technique is theologically significant because of the ubiquity of 
technique. Virtually all aspects of life have become technical, so that technology – the 
discourse about technique – now functions as one of the primary filters through which 
we experience reality. Anything that exerts as much influence and evokes as much 
passion as technology does ought to at least raise the interest of theology. For example, 
what moral claims are made by technology, and at what point does technology become 
idolatrous?
In this section, I examine four perspectives on the moral significance of 
technology: popular culture, social sciences, social criticism, and mythology. At the 
popular level, the discourse about technique contains at least three apparently 
contradictory intuitions: one is that technique is not morally significant, another is that 
“something has gone wrong” or that “things have gone too far” in our technical society 
(technique is morally detrimental), and a third is that technique and technical devices are 
making our lives better (technique is morally beneficial). These popular perspectives on 
technique have their counterparts in philosophical and sociological discourse on 
technique, though consensus in the social sciences seems to be gathering around the 
opinion that technique is morally significant. This intuition is found already among the 
sources of western civilization: in Greek mythology and philosophy. It is picked up in the
earliest social criticism of the technological era, and continues in the voices of modern 
religious social critics.46
45 On the problems with the “piecemeal” approach to understanding technique, see Grant, Technology and
Justice, 34.
46 Though my overview here will be brief, Paul Heidebrecht makes a compelling case for the moral and 
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Evaluations of Technique in Popular Culture and Mass Media
It is probably fair to say that most people would describe the advances of modern 
technique as a good thing. The excitement that is aroused any time a new Apple product 
is announced is a modern example of an optimistic view of technical development. Yet, 
when pressed, most people will also acknowledge that there are some drawbacks to the 
advancements that they value so highly. This will often lead to the more nuanced 
position, also common in popular discourse, that “technology is neither good nor bad; it's 
how you use it that matters.” This view sees technique as morally neutral, ascribing moral
significance to the use that humans make of technique. These two positions are the most 
commonly articulated, but popular discourse about technique also contains a cautious or 
sceptical position, lying just beneath the surface, often expressed by the same people who
are optimistic about technique, and held simultaneously in tension with that optimism. An
example of this position in popular culture is the emergence of a counter-discourse with 
an emphasis on the organic: the search for “organic relationships,” an elevation of 
“organic processes,” and the virtual interchangeability of the word “organic” with 
“authentic.”
The optimistic view of technical development in popular discourse is the view 
associated with advertisers and politicians. Typically, it is said that the present is better 
than the past because of human achievements in controlling brutal nature through 
technique. If there are still problems today, well, they aren't as bad as they once were; yet,
given enough time, we'll solve those too. Infant mortality is down; life expectancy is up; 
theological significance of technology in the first chapter of his dissertation, ‘Re-Reading Yoder in 
Order to Conscientiously Engage Technology Through the Practices of the Church’ (Ph.D. diss., 
Marquette University, 2008).
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violence has declined;47 we have indoor plumbing and refrigeration; we can travel around
the world with ease, or we can stay at home and have the world delivered to us. In short, 
we are living in the best time in human history. If we keep investing in technical 
discoveries, then the future will be even better. According to this view, the benefits of 
technique are not entirely dependent on the use that individuals make of it; rather, 
technique is a positive force in its own right. Though individuals may use the power for 
bad, eventually the beneficial use of techniques is sure to break through. Of course, it 
would be good if everyone chose positive applications for technique to begin with, but it 
is not necessary because the benefits outweigh any negative use individuals may make. If
there is a need for wisdom, it is to discern the effectiveness of the means for the ends that 
the user has determined, rather than to discern the appropriateness of either the means or 
the ends themselves. The greatest need is for individuals to be educated on the latest 
techniques, and how to use them for maximum benefit. This is the operative assumption 
behind charitable organizations like One Laptop Per Child.48
Though such an optimistic attitude is common in popular discourse, few actually 
subscribe to the view in a principled way. Most people, when pressed, will concede that 
technique has produced a lot of bad results along with the good. A technological dystopia 
is as likely as a technological utopia, depending on the choices we make as humanity. 
Since technique can produce both good results and bad, technique is deemed to be 
neutral, and the moral culpability lies with individuals and the choices they make. This is 
the “guns don't kill people; people kill people” argument – applied to any situation. “Cars
47 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011).
48 ‘Mission | One Laptop per Child’, accessed 18 February 2014, http://one.laptop.org/about/mission.
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don't hit cyclists, careless drivers hit cyclists. (Or careless cyclists get in the way of 
cars.)” “Nuclear power can be harnessed for good instead of evil.” Nevertheless, there are
no techniques that should be avoided in principle, only certain uses of technique. So then 
wisdom is required to discern appropriate ends and appropriate means to those ends, 
keeping in mind foreseeable side-effects.
While the optimistic and neutral evaluations of technique are the most articulated 
positions in popular culture, there is also a less articulated position which is also 
pervasive, even though it is submerged. This more sceptical discourse is a response to the
rational systematization and enframing of reality by technique – a depersonalizing 
process which people instinctively reject, even when they lack the language to explain 
why. Following the phenomenal rise in popularity of Facebook, a vocal minority of anti-
Facebook critics was formed, even while users of the service began to use terms like 
“Facecrack” and joked about being “addicted” to the social network.49 Various groups 
responded to the felt need to limit this technique by issuing a “Facebook Challenge” (to 
refrain from Facebook use for 30 days) or committing “Facebook Suicide.”50 
Ecclesiastically, churches that observe Lent began including Facebook alongside 
chocolate and caffeine as a possible vice-to-be-sacrificed.51
49 Tom Hodgkinson, ‘With Friends Like These... Tom Hodgkinson on the Politics of the People Behind 
Facebook’, News, The Guardian, 14 January 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/jan/14/facebook.
50 Alicia Vitarelli, ‘College Students Give up Facebook for a Month’, News, 6abc.com, 7 February 2011, 
http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=7944617; Guy McMusker, ‘Welcome to 
Seppukoo / Assisting Your Virtual Suicide’, Seppukoo, accessed 9 February 2011, 
http://www.seppukoo.com/; moddr_ and Francesco Gamba, ‘Web 2.0 Suicide Machine - Meet Your 
Real Neighbours Again! - Sign out Forever!’, Suicidemachine.org, accessed 14 April 2011, 
http://suicidemachine.org/#faq.
51 DAPD/DPA/ka, ‘Facebook Becoming Popular Sacrifice for Lent’, News, The Local: Germany’s News 
in English, 8 March 2011, http://www.thelocal.de/society/20110308-33575.html; Andy Vance, ‘Lent, 
Facebook, and Sacrifice | Andy Vance’, 11 March 2011, http://www.andyvance.com/?p=419.
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This phenomenon is more than mere distaste for a particular technique or 
company. Before there was Facebook, there was concern that laptops, mobile phones, 
PDAs, and pagers (not to mention land-based phone lines) were infringing on people's 
personal time, diverting them from meaningful pursuits, and increasing their stress by 
providing continuous access to work. One result is that rules of etiquette have evolved to 
limit the use of these devices in churches and theatres, at the dinner table, and while 
driving. One notable example was the Catholic church's statement clarifying that the 
iPhone is not a valid substitute for physical presence during confession to a priest.52
The desire to limit the role of technique in our lives operates at the geopolitical 
level as well. In North America, debates about pipeline development, expanded use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones), and government surveillance of internet 
communication raise the question: How far is too far? Globally, climate change is 
affecting every region of the world, and a solution requires international cooperation at a 
level never before seen. Climate change, however, is only the latest large-scale global 
catastrophe precipitated by unrestrained technique. For a time, the more imminent threat 
was posed by nuclear warfare, while even today, geopolitical manoeuvres such as the 
American war in Iraq were justified by an appeal to the danger of “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction.” On the other hand, the creation of the Large Hadron Collider (referred to by
some in the media as the “Doomsday Collider”) revealed widespread public anxiety 
52 Catherine Hornby, ‘Catholics Cannot Confess via iPhone: Vatican’, News, Reuters, 9 February 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/09/us-vatican-iphone-idUSTRE7182XQ20110209; Dan Gilgoff 
and Hada Messia, ‘Vatican Warns about iPhone Confession App’, News, CNN World, 10 February 2011,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-02-10/world/vatican.confession.app_1_new-app-confession-iphone?
_s=PM:WORLD.
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about the limits and safety of esoteric techniques and devices.53
So whether we are talking about the effects of technique in our personal lives or in
global politics, this third, cautious attitude also exists in popular discourse, often hidden 
and unstated, yet exerting an influence on decisions. For this attitude, technical solutions 
to problems raise suspicion right from the beginning, and wisdom is required to discern 
how technique will change the ends.
The Moral Significance of Technique in Philosophy and Sociology
“Technology is neither good nor bad; it's how you use it that matters.” This turn of
phrase expresses well a debate that exists also among the social sciences and 
technologists. Instrumentalism, the idea that technique is morally neutral, claims that 
moral judgements apply to ends but not means.54 Grant takes up this issue when he 
analyzes the phrase, “The computer does not impose on us the ways it should be used.”55 
What he finds is that a computer is not simply a neutral tool which we can use for 
purposes arrived at separately from technique. Rather, technique is a “package deal.” 
“The coming to be of technology has required changes in what we think is good, what we
think good is, how we conceive sanity and madness, justice and injustice, rationality and 
irrationality, beauty and ugliness.”56
One of the most influential challenges to the moral insignificance of technique 
comes from French sociologist Jacques Ellul. Ellul agrees with the principles of 
53 Alan Boyle, ‘Atom-Smasher Fears Spark Lawsuit’, News, MSNBC, 28 March 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23844529/ns/technology_and_science-science/.
54 Paul Grabow, ‘An Alternative to Instrumentalism: Technology as a Form of Transcendence’, 
International Journal of Technology, Knowledge and Society 4, no. 3 (2008): 197–202.
55 Grant, Technology and Justice, 19.
56 Ibid., 33.
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instrumentalism as far as the idea that an individual device is neither good nor bad. 
Indeed, he claims credit for the idea of the neutrality of technique.57 Nevertheless, his 
portrayal of technique is often characterized as pessimistic and fatalistic. Though this is 
not necessarily the best reading of his work, the description appropriately describes how 
many people feel after reading his work. This is because, for Ellul, the neutrality of 
technique is not a moral neutrality, but rather a neutrality in net gain: the harmful effects 
of technique cannot be separated from its benefits, so in the final evaluation they cancel 
each other out. Yet, in addition to this neutrality, technique comes at a price: it involves 
unintended consequences and it is largely unpredictable.58 Though many people are aware
that technique requires a price, produces unintended consequences, and is unpredictable, 
these factors are usually balanced against the hope of progress or a belief in the essential 
positiveness of technique. This hope is what Ellul denies. Rather than arguing for the 
moral insignificance of technique, the neutrality of technique actually helps Ellul to make
the case that technique is morally significant, since it is in the region of ambiguity that 
Ellul believes moral decisions are required.59
Albert Borgmann's concept of “the device paradigm” is another important 
challenge to the moral insignificance of technique. The device paradigm bridges the 
57 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Bluff (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), xii.
58 Ellul, The Technological Bluff.
59 Ellul's thoughts on morality and ethics are particularly complex, even paradoxical, making it difficult to 
summarize succinctly his conception of the moral significance of technique. For example, his treatise 
on Christian ethics concludes with “the necessity for a Christian ethic” juxtaposed against “the 
impossibility of a Christian ethic” Jacques Ellul, To Will & To Do: An Ethical Research for Christians 
(Philadelphia, PA: Pilgrim Press, 1969). Nevertheless, that technique matters for the moral life is clear 
throughout his work, especially his theological works (e.g., Jacques Ellul, ‘Technique and the Opening 
Chapters of Genesis’, in Theology and Technology: Essays in Christian Analysis and Exegesis, ed. Carl 
Mitcham and Jim Grote [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984], 123–37), which were 
composed intentionally as counterparts to his sociology.
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particular (device) and the general (paradigm) in a way that explains the relationship 
between the use of “neutral” devices and their moral effects. Borgmann conceives of the 
device paradigm as a way of thinking which transforms “focal things and practices” into 
devices and commodities. His best known example is that of the fireplace.60 A fireplace is
a “focal thing” because it gathers people together (in the evening for light and warmth), it
requires skillful engagement (to keep the temperature consistent, to prevent accidents), 
and it orders social arrangements (many are involved in the various chores associated 
with the fireplace). Thus, the fireplace is more than simply an inefficient source of the 
commodity “heat.” It is a focal thing that creates meaning and social cohesion. A central 
heating system, as an example of a device, requires minimal engagement (even less with 
the programmable thermostat) and promotes segregation and isolation (people disperse to
their rooms, which are effortlessly kept comfortable) as it provides a commodity (heat). 
Borgmann's analysis argues that devices and the device paradigm are not “bad,” and yet 
they clearly have effects which are of moral concern.
Finally, ecology gives us one of the most accessible challenges to the idea that 
technique is morally insignificant. Lynn White, Jr.'s seminal essay, “The Historical Roots 
of Our Ecological Crisis,” attributes the modern technique-enabled ecological crisis to 
historic Christian attitudes toward nature, supported by the biblical injunction to “subdue 
the earth” (Genesis 1:26-28).61 On the one hand, modern technique enables the 
destruction of nature and of everything once considered sacred. On the other hand, 
60 Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 41–42.
61 Lynn White Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, Science, New Series, 155, no. 3767 
(1967): 1203–7.
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modern technique owes its existence to Christian demythologizing/desacralization of 
nature. These two observations demonstrate to White that modern technique is infused 
with the moral vice of arrogance or pride toward nature.
Both our present science and our present technology are so tinctured with 
orthodox Christian arrogance toward nature that no solution for our 
ecologic crisis can be expected from them alone. Since the roots of our 
trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially 
religious, whether we call it that or not.62
In this view, technique is inextricably bound to problems which are unavoidably moral. 
His constructive proposal involves the reinterpretation or reevaluation of traditional 
religious commitments, guided, for example, by a recovery of St. Francis as the patron 
saint of ecology.
Ethical Concerns about Technique in Religion-Based Social Criticism
During the technological optimism of the Scientific Revolution, the first major 
figure to question the value of technique was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Perhaps the 
original social critic of technique in modern times, Rousseau's critique stemmed 
specifically from religious and moral considerations. Though he did not doubt the 
achievements themselves, he questioned the value of the advancements in the arts and 
sciences, and maintained that civilization should be judged instead by its achievements in
morality and the general happiness of its people.63 His famous “Discourse on the Sciences
and the Arts” anticipates a time when humanity will be able to look back through history 
and discern its trajectory. Then, 
62 Ibid., 1207.
63 Davis, Means Without End, 92–93.
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unless they are more foolish than we are, they will throw up their hands to 
heaven and will say with a bitter heart: “Almighty God, thou who holds all
spirits in thy hands, deliver us from the enlightenment and fatal arts of our 
fathers and give us back ignorance, innocence and poverty, the sole goods 
that might create our happiness and which are precious in thy sight.”64
Rousseau's radical critique is significant for this project not because of its particular 
tenets, but rather for its dependance on a religious narrative. We do not need to agree with
Rousseau's evaluation of technique in order to see that Rousseau's criticisms are based on
a religious sensibility. The scientific thinkers of the period (Bacon, Descartes, Newton, et.
al.) were, for the most part, enabled to make their discoveries by separating their 
hypotheses as well as their conclusions from religious dogma. Fact was separated from 
Value, and Means were separated from Ends. Society was judged to be progressing 
because of its increasing ability to describe (and control) the natural world. In this 
context, Rousseau insisted that the value of a society could only be judged by its 
achievements in morality, and in particular by its capacity for compassion.
More recently, at least two books by disillusioned secular philosophers have 
extolled the value of simplicity, which they find in manual labour and in “unplugging” 
from technique.65 Yet within the Christian tradition, this impulse is as old as the desert 
fathers and mothers, and has been been preserved by monastic disciplines and the 
lifestyle of various renewal movements, including early anabaptism and modern Amish 
communities.66 It is important, therefore, that theology also discover a way to incorporate 
64 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Major Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Two Discourses 
and the Social Contract, trans. John T. Scott (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 34.
65 Matthew Crawford, Shop Class As Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2009); Eric Brende, Better Off: Flipping the Switch on Technology (New York, NY: 
HarperCollins, 2004).
66 Donald B. Kraybill, The Riddle of Amish Culture (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1989); see also Heidebrecht, ‘Re-Reading Yoder’, 49–57.
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these emphases in its discussions of technique.
For religious social critics today, the concept of limits is a motif that runs 
throughout the discourse on technique. In his political theology and in his bioethics, 
Stanley Hauerwas argues for an ethic of humility that embraces suffering as a normal part
of Christian discipleship.67 He questions the biomedical desire for “self-improvement” 
and proposes virtue ethics (fostered in a community of character) as a limit to the politics 
of self-interest, in which a concept of a common good (as an end) plays little or no role, 
and in which self-interest functions as the correct means for producing whatever can be 
called the common good. So, he suggests, “The first social task of the church is to 
provide the space and time necessary for developing skills of interpretation and 
discrimination sufficient to help us recognize the possibilities and limits of our society.”68
Similarly, Albert Borgmann and Richard Gaillardetz each propose a certain asceticism by
way of engagement with focal things (especially liturgy) as necessary to the search for 
God in a technological society.69 Marva Dawn links the recovery of hope in a 
technological milieu specifically to the focal practice of baptism and a life limited by 
divine law.70 Lynn White, Jr. characterizes the current ecological problem as one of 
67 Stanley Hauerwas, ‘Anabaptist Eyes on Biotechnology’, in Viewing New Creations with Anabaptist 
Eyes: Ethics of Biotechnology, ed. Roman J. Miller, Beryl H. Brubaker, and James C. Peterson (Telford,
PA: Cascadia, 2005), 243–53; Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on 
Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1988); see also Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian 
Social Ethic (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
68 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, 74.
69 Albert Borgmann, Power Failure: Christianity in the Culture of Technology (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos 
Press, 2003); see also Albert Borgmann, ‘Contingency and Grace in An Age of Science and 
Technology’, Theology Today 59, no. 1 (2002): 6–20; Richard R. Gaillardetz, Transforming Our Days: 
Spirituality, Community and Liturgy in a Technological Culture (New York, NY: Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 2000).
70 Marva Dawn, Unfettered Hope: A Call to Faithful Living in an Affluent Society (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 153–182.
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arrogance toward nature, and proposes a recovery of the virtue of humility as modelled 
by St. Francis.71 Wendell Berry advocates a rootedness in the particular and the local as a 
necessary limit to the technological culture of utility, consumption, and domination.72 
Arthur Boers describes spiritual disciplines, in particular walking and pilgrimage, as a 
balm for the ills of modern technological society.73 As a group, the proposals of authors in
this vein highlight the need for theology to grapple more deeply with technique than it 
has thus far.74
The Limits of Technique in Greek Myth and Worldview
Christian ethicists are by no means pioneers in their engagement with technique: 
the evaluation of technique has always been a religious task. In the Western tradition, 
going back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, religious myths have always given 
orientation to people as they relate to technique. Perhaps the most famous is the myth of 
Prometheus. Prometheus, whose name literally means “Forethinker,” favoured humanity 
71 White, ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, 1206.
72 Wendell Berry, Life Is a Miracle: An Essay Against Modern Superstition (Washington, D.C.: 
Counterpoint, 2000); Wendell Berry, ‘Feminism, the Body, and the Machine’, Cross Currents 53, no. 1 
(2003): 32–47. On the role of limits in politics, see, Wendell Berry, The Way of Ignorance: And Other 
Essays (Emeryville, CA: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2005); Wendell Berry, The Work of Local Culture, Iowa 
Humanities Lecture (Great Barrington, MA: E.F. Schumacher Society, 1988); and Wendell Berry, The 
Gift of Good Land: Further Essays, Cultural and Agricultural (San Francisco: North Point Press, 1981).
73 Arthur P. Boers, The Way Is Made by Walking: A Pilgrimage Along the Camino De Santiago (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007); see also Arthur P. Boers, ‘Walking Lessons: The Practice of 
Pilgrimage’, Christian Century 124, no. 26 (2007): 22–26; John Shorb, ‘Walking as a Focal Practice: 
Q&A with Arthur Paul Boers’, Church Health Reader, 2009, 
http://www.hopeandhealing.org/contentPage.aspx?resource_id=324.
74 Brad J. Kallenberg, God and Gadgets: Following Jesus in a Technological Age (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 
2011); Murray Jardine, The Making and Unmaking of Technological Society: How Christianity Can 
Save Modernity from Itself (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004); Quentin Schultze, Habits of the 
High-Tech Heart: Living Virtuously in the Information Age (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2002);
Quentin Schultze, High-Tech Worship?: Using Presentational Technologies Wisely (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Books, 2004); Kathleen Cahalan, ‘Temperance and Technology’, Chicago Studies 41, no. 1 
(2002): 26–35; Alan R. Drengson, ‘The Sacred and the Limits of the Technological Fix’, Zygon 19, no. 
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and so stole fire from the gods and gave it to humanity. There are several versions of the 
story, the most important found in Hesiod's Theogony, Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and
Plato's Protagoras. In Hesiod's version, which is the earliest, humanity possesses fire, but
Zeus retracts it and the “means of life” in retribution for Prometheus' trickery. When 
Prometheus returns the fire, Zeus has him chained to a rock to be eaten daily by an eagle 
as punishment, and also creates Pandora to plague humanity. The moral: “Thus it is not 
possible to deceive or elude the mind of Zeus. For not even Iagetus' son, guileful 
Prometheus, escaped his heavy wrath, but by necessity a great bond holds him down, 
shrewd though he be.”75 Throughout Aeschylus' play, Prometheus does not only steal fire,
but claims responsibility for teaching humanity all of the civilizing arts, as well as 
preventing Zeus from destroying humanity. Prometheus is presented not as a warning (as 
in Hesiod) but as a tragic rebel-hero. In Plato's version, Prometheus steals the art of 
working fire from Hephaestus, the god of the forge, and other techniques from Athena, 
the goddess of wisdom or craftiness and of war. He does this to compensate for the 
mistake of his brother Epimetheus (Afterthinker), who gave all the gifts of survival to the
animals but not to humanity.76 The gifts of Prometheus thus provided the wisdom or craft 
required for humanity to sustain life individually. They did not, however, provide the 
political wisdom required for humanity to co-exist in communities and become civilized. 
Later, says Plato, the human race in their isolation from each other were at risk of 
destruction by the animals, so Zeus granted to humanity the greater virtues of justice and 
reverence that allow political communities to exist. It was these gifts that allowed 
75 Hesiod, Theogony 613-616.
76 Plato, Protagoras 320d-322a.
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humankind to flourish and prosper in a way that nature would never have permitted, 
given the general frailty of humans in their natural state.
So the poets' and the philosophers' evaluations of Prometheus' gift of technique 
were mixed. According to Hesiod, it was Prometheus' trickery that lead Zeus to conceal 
fire – along with “the means of life” – in the first place. The return of the fire by 
Prometheus was thus poor repayment for the loss of “the means of life,” which would 
have allowed humans to accomplish in one day of work all that was necessary to live for 
one year. However, in Aeschylus' version of the story, it was Zeus' intention to destroy the
human race (as he had destroyed five previous mortal races). Prometheus thus emerged as
humanity's champion by thwarting Zeus' plans, while the gift of technique was at least 
partially responsible, as it gave humans an advantage against natural forces which would 
previously have ruined them. In Plato's version, the gifts of Prometheus are of limited 
value: they enable humanity's survival, but the greater gifts come from Zeus.
A second important myth about technique is that of Icarus. In this story, a master 
craftsman, Daedalus, and his son, Icarus, were imprisoned on Crete. Daedalus 
constructed wings for his son and himself in order to escape. As they prepared to leave, 
Daedalus instructed Icarus not to fly too high, which would cause the wax to melt and 
destroy the wings, nor too low, which would cause the wings to become heavy with 
moisture and cause him to sink into the sea. The boy, however, became thrilled by flight 
and soared higher and higher, ignoring his father's warning until it was too late and the 
wings had disintegrated. This myth expressed well the Greek attitude toward life in 
general: namely, the ideal of harmony and balance in all things. As it pertains to 
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technique, though, it even more clearly expressed a concern for technical limits – the 
ideal of flying neither too high nor too low.
The mythological understanding of technical limits gave expression in dramatic 
form to a worldview that was also held by the Greek philosophers. This worldview 
considered technique to be neutral at best; at worst, it was a distraction from the 
attainment of true happiness (e.g., through philosophy). To the best of our knowledge, 
there was no view among the philosophers which saw technique as a good in itself. For 
this reason, technique could never have become, for the philosophers, an end in itself.77 
Rather, the development and use of technique were always constrained by the worthiness 
of the ends to which technique was applied. Although examples of this worldview can be 
found throughout the Greek philosophers, they are perhaps most clearly discerned in 
Plato. Plato's location of ultimate reality and true happiness in the realm of the Ideal 
discouraged philosophers from “dirtying their hands” with the manipulation of nature 
through techne, since nothing of permanence could be gained thereby.78 Indeed, the 
opposite occurred in the case of Archimedes, the famous mathematician who, though he 
was highly successful as an engineer, began to despise utility and profit and gave up his 
engineering practice in order to study geometry and philosophy.79 Plato's disciple, 
Aristotle, took a more positive view of material reality, and yet he also considered techne 
to be inferior to philosophy. However, Aristotle's judgement was based not on the 
inferiority of its subject matter, but on the subservient nature of technique itself. Aristotle 
77 Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, 186.
78 Davis, Means Without End, 11–16.
79 Ibid., 15; Elspeth Whitney, ‘The Mechanical Arts in the Context of Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century 
Thought’ (Ph.D. diss., City University of New York, 1985), 50.
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understood techne as always serving some other telos; thus, its essence was inferior to the
essence of philosophy, which contains within itself its own telos.80
THEOLOGICAL PARTICIPATION IN TECHNOLOGY
Despite the vibrant conceptions of technique in ancient Greek mythology and 
philosophy, historically theology has not often discussed technique. Perhaps part of the 
reason is that, for most of Christian history, technique has developed so slowly that it did 
not draw attention to itself as a particularly notable feature of human life. Technology 
was not studied systematically as a discipline; rather, techniques were developed almost 
by accident. Yet for a long time, even after the age of science had begun and technology 
began to be studied, theology continued to ignore its significance.81 This changed early in
the twentieth century, when Paul Tillich's and Martin Heidegger's respective treatments of
technique offered two ways for theology to proceed.82 Tillich used the word “technology”
to refer broadly to both instrument and symbol. For Tillich, technology was but one 
factor (alongside capitalism and mathematical science) influencing the “world situation.” 
Tillich was interested primarily in understanding the “world situation,” and technology 
was one important piece in that puzzle.
80 Davis, Means Without End, 5–6.
81 This is not to discount the notable work which has been done on medieval theologies of technique, 
which is uncovering a significant, though often overlooked, area of medieval theological inquiry. See 
Whitney, ‘The Mechanical Arts in the Context of Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century Thought’; Elspeth 
Whitney, ‘Paradise Restored. The Mechanical Arts from Antiquity through the Thirteenth Century’, 
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 80, no. 1 (1990): 1–169. See also, Lynn White Jr., 
Medieval Religion and Technology: Collected Essays (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
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Manual Labor’, Technology and Culture 27, no. 3 (1986): 477–500; Ernst Benz, Evolution and 
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Heidegger approached “technology” differently, however. He understood the 
essence of technology to be bigger than just one piece influencing the world situation; 
technology operated at the level of “enframing” and “revealing.” According to Heidegger,
the enframing of technology reveals reality by organizing and structuring it, thereby 
closing up human freedom. Given a choice between these two distinct approaches toward
technique, theology has generally followed Tillich in subordinating it to socio-political 
concerns. In most theological discourse, technique is treated as one piece in the bigger 
puzzle of the “world situation,” rather than as the frame which surrounds the entire 
puzzle, as Heidegger described. Yet, even though Heidegger's analysis of technique has 
not found much purchase within theological discourse, the tradition of Heidegger persists
and has been developed into a specialty by various non-religious disciplines such as 
philosophy and sociology.
This was the situation for most of the twentieth century, but in the late twentieth 
century and early twenty first, technique has actually begun to receive increasing 
theological treatment. Part of the reason for this shift is that the questions and the 
problems have changed. The problem of the early twentieth century, i.e., of Heidegger, 
Tillich, et al., could be described as the problem of a technical environment. They were 
interested in the effects of technique on the present, on the world situation, on reality. 
However, in more recent theological discourse the question has shifted to that of a 
technical eschaton. Though the roots of this approach can also be traced to the early 
twentieth century in the body of writings by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, he remained a 
marginal voice, and his perspective did not really begin to shape the discourse on 
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technique until later in the twentieth century. The Teilhardian interest in technique 
focuses on the ways that technical progress can be leveraged for human benefit in the 
eschatological future. The theological contribution of Teilhard de Chardin to technology 
has been to ask questions about appropriate goals (e.g. love, or “amorization”) and to 
connect visions of the technical future with theological discussions about the purposes of 
God.
Describing the Environment
The major works that come up in any theological study of technique include 
Heidegger's series of lectures, compiled as The Question Concerning Technology and 
Tillich's various articles, collected in The Spiritual Situation in our Technical Society. In 
Heidegger's treatment, technical artifacts are completely irrelevant, except as 
instantiations of the idea of “technology.” Heidegger's primary interest is in describing 
the essence of “technology,” which he identifies as enframing. Enframing functions as 
one way of revealing. What is significant about enframing is that, as a way of revealing, 
it is all-encompassing. It tends, by nature, to include everything in its system. Secondly, 
because enframing proceeds by rational systematization, it closes up human freedom by 
locking things and ideas into logical connection with each other. This lead to two 
preeminent questions in subsequent discussions of technique: “Is technique 
autonomous?” and, “Is technique beneficial?” The conclusion of the titular series of 
lectures suggests Heidegger's answers to these questions: technique is autonomous, and it
is not entirely beneficial. Indeed, here Heidegger moves beyond description and into 
prescription as he posits the possibility that art, as another child of techne, can offer an 
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alternative way of revealing that proceeds not by enframing but by a direct uncovering of 
a being's essence.
Tillich's discussion, like Heidegger's, is primarily descriptive. For Tillich, 
“technology” is everywhere, and in every act, including those of “nature.” Therefore, 
technique itself is not a problem so much as the particular mode of technique in the 
modern era – what he terms “transforming technology,” which exists alongside 
“developmental technology” and “actualizing technology.” “Transforming technology” is
unique because it destroys materials foreign to its purpose in the service of its purpose.83 
Yet, as this aspect of technique becomes more prominent, the importance of “means” also
increases to the point that modern society is determined by “the methods and 
organization of industry.” As a result, the technical society is one in which means have 
become ends in themselves. Although Tillich expressly adopts description as his strategy, 
his work implies also a hope that such description will uncover the meaning of our age as
well as the appropriate response to it.84
Barbour's series of Gifford Lectures, published in two volumes as Religion in an 
Age of Science and Ethics in an Age of Technology, is an important landmark in the 
description of technique.85 In Ethics, Barbour begins by developing a three-part typology 
of “technology as liberator,” “technology as threat,” and “technology as instrument of 
power.”86 He concludes that technology is best understood as an instrument of power, 
which includes both threatening and liberating aspects. The remainder of Ethics assumes 
83 Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, 53–54.
84 Ibid., xvii.
85 Ian G. Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology, vol. 2, 2 vols., Gifford Lectures 1989-1991 (London: 
SCM Press, 1992).
86 Ibid., 2:3–4.
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this understanding of technology. Barbour's next-to-last chapter is on “Controlling 
Technology,” and Barbour demonstrates that he believes technique needs to be managed 
for positive purposes.87 So in Ethics, the two questions raised by Heidegger's work are 
answered in another way: technique is not autonomous, and technique can be used for 
both good and evil. Though Ethics does not comment on the meaning of our age, its 
response to the questions raised by Tillich's work is to offer a possible and compelling 
vision of an appropriate response to technique. Technique can be controlled by 
governments and change can occur through education, political action, the influence of 
various crises, and a vision of alternatives. In an “age of technology,” ethics are necessary
because of the great potential for both good and evil.
Though his description of technique was not entirely new, Barbour's typology has 
been important because it has allowed theology to move beyond descriptions (in the 
mode of Tillich and Heidegger) of technique and into ethics. By positioning his idea of 
the “instrument of power” between the extremes of a “pessimism” in which no ethic is 
possible and an “optimism” in which no ethic is necessary, Barbour was able to connect 
his description of technique with a programme of action. Barbour's typology or some 
modification of it88 has now become standard in theological discussions of technique.89
As a result of the work of Heidegger, Tillich, and Barbour, technique is a common
motif in theology today. Almost any theology of culture must include a reference to 
87 Ibid., 2:213–241.
88 Robert John Russell, ‘Five Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology from a Christian Perspective’, 
Theology and Science 1, no. 2 (2003): 149.
89 See White, Christian Worship and Technological Change, 23ff. See also the recent doctoral 
dissertations by Stephen Robert Garner, ‘Transhumanism and the Imago Dei: Narratives of 
Apprehension and Hope’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Auckland, 2006), 22ff; James Alan Fenimore, Jr., 
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“technology” somewhere. Even works that are not directly about technique or culture still
have to deal with the changing context of theology in a technical environment: 
theological discourse has changed because of innovations as simple as chapter headings 
and indexes, while the impact of a world-wide conversation enabled by a global 
communications network is only beginning to be felt. Whether it is recognized or not, 
technique has had an impact on the way in which theology is done.90
The motif of technique occurs most often in theological descriptions of culture. 
Technical methods are important when theology discusses the transmission of the gospel 
into culture, the work of God in the world, or the relevance of Christ for any of a number 
of social issues, including poverty and justice, war and peace, or morality and values. 
Theologians find it helpful to take technique into account when addressing these various 
cultural issues, but their purpose in talking about technique is merely to describe it – 
especially as it relates to their given topic. Authors such as Douglas John Hall,91 William 
Cavanaugh,92 Duane Friesen,93 John Stackhouse, Jr.,94 Oliver O'Donovan,95 Mark 
90 For a discussion of the role of the internet in particular, see Paul A. Soukup, Francis J. Buckley, and 
David C. Robinson, ‘The Influence of Information Technologies on Theology’, Theological Studies 62, 
no. 2 (2001): 366–77.
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Fortress, 1989).
92 ‘The World in a Wafer: A Geography of the Eucharist as Resistance to Globalization’, Modern 
Theology 15, no. 2 (1999): 181–96.
93 Artists, Citizens, Philosophers: Seeking the Peace of the City: An Anabaptist Theology of Culture 
(Waterloo, ON: Herald Press, 2000).
94 Making the Best of It: Following Christ in the Real World (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
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95 Begotten or Made?: Human Procreation and Medical Technique (New York, NY: Oxford University 
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Stob Lectures (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); see also Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood 
O’Donovan, Bonds of Imperfection: Christian Politics, Past and Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
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Wallace,96 Stanley Hauerwas,97 and Marva Dawn,98  continue to reference technology as 
an aspect of the world (one piece of the puzzle) that needs to be addressed by their social 
ethics. Their concerns generally take the following form: “What should we do about 
poverty in a technological society?” or “How can we increase a sense of community, or 
justice, in a technological society?”
Imagining an Eschaton
The one area in which theology goes beyond description is in discussions of 
“fringe technology.” What I am calling “fringe technology” is that broad area of 
technology that deals with problems which are not yet parts of everyday discourse or use.
It includes such issues as artificial intelligence, cloning, experimental medical techniques,
nuclear energy, some forms of ecology, and future technique. What unites these areas of 
concern under one heading is that they belong to the domain of the specialist; in other 
words, they are on the “fringe” of public experience and perception. Though many of the 
issues they raise are of public concern, and the public may have strong opinions about 
them, in these areas agendas are set and decisions are controlled by the specialist. 
Theological discourse on these topics typically proceeds either by appealing directly to 
the specialist or by influencing the public to pressure elected officials who control the 
specialist's funding. Alternatively, theologians must become specialists themselves, or 
vice versa. So, on the one hand, pastors and laypersons sign petitions and form lobby 
groups, and, on the other hand, there are academic journals and high level 
96 Fragments of the Spirit: Nature, Violence, and the Renewal of Creation (New York, NY: Continuum, 
1996).
97 A Community of Character.
98 Unfettered Hope.
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interdisciplinary conferences on Christian bioethics.
Theological participation in fringe technology tends to be more optimistic than 
social criticism of present-day techniques. The focus on the future in these discussions 
presents technique, often explicitly, in an eschatological light. The “already” possibilities 
of fringe technique seem to awaken theological hope, while the “not yet” of the dangers 
seems to diminish the perception of risk.99 Yet, as a result of their optimism toward 
techniques of the future, theologians have been able to move beyond a primarily 
philosophical and methodological analysis and have begun to engage technique on its 
own level – that is, at the level of the device, which Heidegger had previously deemed 
insignificant. The authors in this vein have begun to think theologically about computer-
brain interfacing, genome manipulation, and the internet. This process was greatly 
assisted by Philip Hefner's concept of the “created co-creator” and Niels Gregersen's 
“autopoiesis,” which provided theological terminology for a view that was already 
common in the broader religion-and-science discussion. It is also inspired by Teilhard de 
Chardin's evolutionary theology.
In the early twentieth century, Teilhard de Chardin provided what has been 
perhaps the most outstanding and original of theological engagements with fringe 
99 For examples of this trend, see Noreen Herzfeld, ‘Terminator or Super Mario: Human/Computer 
Hybrids, Actual and Virtual’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44, no. 4 (2005): 347–53; Stephen Robert 
Garner, ‘Hacking with the Divine: A Metaphor for Theology-Technology Engagement’, Colloquium 37,
no. 2 (2005): 181–95; Gregory R Peterson, ‘Imaging God: Cyborgs, Brain Machine Interfaces, and a ‐
More Human Future’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44, no. 4 (2005): 337–46; Ted Peters, ‘Hybrids & 
Human Integrity: Christian Anthropology and the Post-Human Future’, Dialog: A Journal of Theology 
44, no. 4 (2005): 336–95; Barbara Strassberg, ‘Magic, Religion, Science, Technology, and Ethics in the 
Postmodern World’, Zygon 40, no. 2 (2005): 307–22; Charles P. Henderson, ‘The Internet as a 
Metaphor for God?’, Cross Currents 50, no. 1–2 (2000): 77–83. Within religious studies more 
generally, see Rachel Wagner and Frances Flannery-Dailey, ‘Wake up! Worlds of Illusion in 
Gnosticism, Buddhism, and The Matrix Project’, in Philosophers Explore The Matrix, ed. Christopher 
Grau (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 258–87. 
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technique. As a Jesuit and an evolutionary biologist, Teilhard de Chardin developed a 
theology of progress leading toward the eventual eschatological perfection of humanity 
and the world. Key to this development was his concept of a “noosphere,” a region of 
influence formed by the existence and pooling of self-conscious minds. The noosphere 
was the historical product of the geosphere and the biosphere. For Teilhard de Chardin, 
just as biological existence (the biosphere) builds upon and transforms the geological 
world (the geosphere), so self-conscious existence (the noosphere) builds upon and 
transforms both biological and geological reality. (In some cases, the noosphere is seen as
realized in the Internet, which makes Teilhard de Chardin's eschatological vision seem to 
be partially fulfilled.) Self-consciousness was important to his cosmology because it 
allowed for reflection, a turning back upon oneself. Ultimately, Teilhard de Chardin 
believed that this reflection would result in the Omega Point, a time when a self-
conscious noosphere, or “Collective Christ,” having reached the limits of organized 
complexity, would choose to reduce itself to a singular consciousness, or “Christ 
Personal.” As the sole observer of the universe, this single consciousness would also be 
the sole organizer of the universe on a quantum mechanical level; the universe would 
effectively become the “cosmic body” of the Christ Personal.
Scientific and technical development were crucial to Teilhard de Chardin's 
controversial vision of human fulfilment in the Omega Point. He believed that God was 
at the centre of history and the universe, pulling humanity toward the Omega Point 
through the processes of evolution. Indeed, the technical discovery of fire was 
indispensable for the evolution of the mind itself. For Teilhard de Chardin, it was 
50
humanity's destiny to make and to understand, so that even love may become a force 
amenable to technical control. “The day will come when, after harnessing the ether, the 
winds, the tides, gravitation, we shall harness for God the energies of love. And, on that 
day, for the second time in the history of the world, man will have discovered fire.”100 For
this reason, Teilhard de Chardin has sometimes been considered a process theologian, 
although his theology is also existentialist and evolutionary.101
After Teilhard de Chardin and until the end of the twentieth century, theological 
discussions of fringe technique focused mainly on biomedical issues. This involved the 
well-known problems of genetic engineering, stem-cell research, end-of-life 
considerations and various other ethical concerns. Though the standard response to these 
questions by theologians was typically cautious,102 recently a new wave of theologians, 
including Philip Hefner, Willem Drees, Ronald Cole-Turner, and James Peterson, have 
embraced biotechnology as an appropriate expression of human creativity.103 Based in 
100 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, ‘The Evolution of Chastity’, in Toward the Future (New York, NY: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), 86–87. See also Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of 
Man (London: Collins, 1965).
101 A. O. Dyson, ‘Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre’, ed. Alan Richardson, A Dictonary of Christian Theology 
(London: SCM Press, 1969); Ismael Garcìa, ‘Teilhard de Chardin, Marie-Joseph-Pierre (1881-1955)’, 
ed. Justo L. González, The Westminster Dictionary of Theologians (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2006).
102 For example, see John Breck, ‘Bio-Medical Technology: Of the Kingdom or of the Cosmos?’, St. 
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1988): 5–26; Audrey R. Chapman, ‘Genetic Engineering 
and Theology: Exploring the Interconnections’, Theology Today 59, no. 1 (2002): 71–89; Celia Deane‐
Drummond, ‘Fabricated Humans? Human Genetics, Ethics and the Christian Wisdom Tradition’, 
Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44, no. 4 (2005): 365–74; Gerald P. McKenny, ‘Technologies of Desire: 
Theology, Ethics, and the Enhancement of Human Traits’, Theology Today 59, no. 1 (2002): 90–103; 
Gerald P. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics, Technology, and the Body (Albany, 
NY: University of New York Press, 1997).
103 Philip J. Hefner, ‘The Evolution of the Created Co-Creator’, Currents in Theology and Mission 15, no. 
6 (1988): 512–25; Philip J. Hefner, ‘Technology and Human Becoming’, Zygon 37, no. 3 (2002): 655–
65; Willem B. Drees, ‘“Playing God? Yes!”: Religion in the Light of Technology’, Zygon 37, no. 3 
(2002): 643–54; Willem B. Drees, Technology, Trust, and Religion: Roles of Religions in Controversies 
on Ecology and the Modification of Life (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2009); Ronald Cole-Turner, 
Pastoral Genetics: Theology and Care at the Beginning of Life (Cleveland, OH: Pilgrim Press, 1996); 
Ronald Cole-Turner, Genetics and Theology: The Anxiety of Change and the Humility of Hope (Oxford:
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part on incarnational theology and certain interpretations of the imago Dei, this approach 
asserts that “playing God” is actually a part of human destiny or purpose.104 Thus, it 
optimistically directs biomedical technology toward the goals of transhumanism and the 
post-human. A bold but characteristic example comes from H. Tristram Engelhardt, the 
current editor-in-chief for Christian Bioethics:
There are no overbearing reasons to maintain human nature as it is, 
uncontaminated by manufactured genes or by genes from other species. 
Human nature as a cluster of inherited capacities is no more inviolate than 
it is secure from mutations. We as persons cannot step outside of genetic 
constraints, but we can change or alter those constraints. Over the long run
we are likely to do that and in so doing revise human nature better to meet 
the goals of persons. Then the issues will not be simply moral, but 
aesthetic as well. We will need to remember to do not only what is good, 
but also what is beautiful.105
This passage exemplifies a major theme within theological bioethics: the inevitability of 
technical progress. As this line of thinking argues, the best that individuals can do is try to
direct technique toward acceptable ends.
The theological terms, “created co-creator” and “autopoiesis” were introduced by 
theologians in conversation with evolutionary biology and systems theory. In the context 
of evolutionary biology, the terms refer to the self-transformation of the human species as
a whole. As an interpretation of Genesis 1-2, the concept of the created co-creator 
Harris Manchester College, 1996); Ronald Cole-Turner, ed., Human Cloning: Religious Responses 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997); Ronald Cole-Turner, ed., Beyond Cloning: 
Religion and the Remaking of Humanity (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2001); Ronald 
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Modification, Basic Bioethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008); James C. Peterson, Genetic Turning
Points: The Ethics of Human Genetic Intervention (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001).
104 Drees, ‘Playing God? Yes!’. See also Patrick D. Hopkins, ‘Protecting God from Science and 
Technology: How Religious Criticisms of Biotechnologies Backfire’, Zygon 37, no. 2 (2002): 317–43; 
H. Tristram Engelhardt, ‘Persons and Humans: Refashioning Ourselves in a Better Image and 
Likeness’, Zygon 19, no. 3 (1984): 281–95.
105 Engelhardt, ‘Persons and Humans’, 294.
52
suggests that a part of human nature is to create as God creates and in participation with 
God.106 Autopoiesis contributes to this understanding by articulating how humans 
participate in creation: autopoiesis is the ability of systems to produce genuinely new 
features within themselves, which is more than simply self-organization but not quite 
self-creation, since the origin of the system requires external input.107 Theological 
justification for these concepts is based on kenosis, the idea of God's self-limitation. They
are also inspired by Teilhard de Chardin's eschatological speculations, particularly about 
the evolution of a “noosphere” of human consciousness.108 In general, these concepts 
have helped to describe and rehabilitate a positive view of human progress, which had, 
following two world wars, fallen out of favour.
The terms “autopoiesis” and “created co-creator” are useful in the field of 
bioethics, but also in the emerging discussion around cybernetics. Biotechnology 
represents a modern, self-aware version of “co-creation,” where the genetic modification 
of individuals has an inevitable effect on the evolution of the entire species. Cybernetics, 
or human-machine interfacing, has a similar effect on a macroscopic level, though it has 
evoked less controversy. This is partially because the field is so new, but also because it is
seen to involve fewer ethical dilemmas: the cyborg, being a conscious adult, is capable of
taking responsibility in a way that a zygote is not. As many already note, cybernetics is 
not a thing of the future: we already have pacemakers, hearing aids, artificial and robotic 
106 Hefner, ‘The Evolution of the Created Co-Creator’.
107 Niels Henrik Gregersen, ‘The Idea of Creation and the Theory of Autopoietic Processes’, Zygon 33, no.
3 (1998): 333–67; Niels Henrik Gregersen, ‘Autopoiesis: Less than Self-Constitution, More than Self-
Organization’, Zygon 34, no. 1 (1999): 117–38.
108 Philip J. Hefner, The Promise of Teilhard: The Meaning of the Twentieth Century in Christian 
Perspective (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970); See also Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man 
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1964); Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man.
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limbs, smart phones, and search engines that can predict our preferences (e.g., Google, 
Amazon, or iTunes). In these areas, the line between person and tool is increasingly being
blurred as we increasingly offload certain human functions onto devices.109 Yet 
theological discussion and evaluation of transhumanism often ignores these features, 
except to note their a priori existence as justification for the transhumanist project in 
general. Rather, theologians direct their inquiries toward the techniques of the future, a 
technological eschaton.
Theological participation in fringe technology is important as the one area in 
which theology typically goes beyond description and sets some kind of normative 
values. What is missing in theological discussions of fringe technique, both biological 
and cybernetic, is the real possibility of popular engagement or control of the discourse. 
These areas are dominated by the specialist (both research scientists and commercial 
interests) and usually enter the public domain only as consumer products. By that point, 
the real ethical decisions have been made; all that is left is the choice to consume or not 
to consume. Furthermore, the majority of theologians who are capable of engaging the 
scientific aspects on their own terms see no need to analyze the discourse about 
technique, since their language is already governed by the grammar of technology (that 
is, of control and efficiency).
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I examined the ethical and moral significance of technique in 
popular culture and mass media, in philosophy and sociology, in religion-based social 
109 Garner, ‘Transhumanism and the Imago Dei’; see also Brent Waters, ‘What Is Christian about Christian
Bioethics?’, Christian Bioethics 11, no. 3 (2005): 281–95.
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criticism, and in ancient Greek myth and worldview. I then described the two main ways 
in which Christian theology itself participates in technology. In summary, popular culture 
recognizes a need to use moral discretion regarding technique. Philosophy and sociology 
have identified various ethical and moral issues connected to technique. Modern social 
critics cite religious reasons for their evaluations of technique or they articulate religious 
responses to technique. Ancient cultures found a place for technique within their 
cosmologies, and thus prescribed it a limited role in society. All of these are good reasons
for theology to engage with technology. Yet theological engagement with technology 
primarily takes only two modes: describing the current state of the technological society, 
or imagining a future technological society. It is my contention that theology needs to 
delve more deeply beneath the surface to think about the meaning of technique – to 
formulate powerful cosmologies, like those in ancient Greece, that include technique.
One way to delve beneath the surface and uncover the meaning of technique is by 
analyzing the spirit of technique. Spirit pertains to the essence of a thing, rather than its 
appearance. Therefore, an analysis of the spirit of technique moves beyond the superficial
to the heart of technique. In the next chapter, I survey some of the current uses of spirit-
language by technology in order to show that spirit is indeed relevant to technology.
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CHAPTER 3:
THE GHOSTS IN THE MACHINE: USES OF SPIRIT-LANGUAGE BY TECHNOLOGY
In the previous chapter, I described typical approaches to theological engagement 
with technique. These can be summarized in two movements: first, as describing the 
technological environment, and, second, as imagining a technological eschaton. Both of 
these are important theological modes; the problem is that theology has allowed 
technology to define itself. Theology has not brought its own language to the table, and 
so it has largely functioned to add a religious veneer to technology. In this way, theology 
relinquishes its critical function.
As the previous chapter showed, there are many areas of overlap between 
technology and theology. Attempting to address all of them is far beyond the scope of this
project. For example, theology has already begun to engage technology on such themes 
as creation, incarnation, eschatology, and ethics. However, one area in which theological 
engagement is less developed is in the area of pneumatology. Engaging with the spirit-
language in technology is important because it allows us to move beyond the atomized 
focus on individual devices or techniques and to look at technique as a whole, without 
reducing it to a superficial simplicity.
Because the spirit-language in technology proper has not previously received 
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theological treatment, I will begin by examining the spirit-language in three specific 
fields of technology: science, ecology, and technological social criticism. Each of these 
fields uses spirit-language and has, to some extent, received some attention from 
pneumatology. In the fourth section of this chapter, however, I will turn to the use of 
spirit-language in technology proper.
The use of spirit-language is not consistent across the technological sub-
disciplines. First, in religion-and-science discussions, spirit has recently been invoked as 
an explanatory link between the strict causality of physics and the Christian doctrine of 
divine action in the world.110 Second, in ecological discussions (especially ecotheology), 
spirit is depicted as indwelling creation, thus sacralizing nature and adding moral gravity 
to what might otherwise be considered a purely materialistic problem of ecological 
destruction.111 Third, in social criticism, spirit is seen as an important aspect of social 
110 Stuart A. Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred: A New View of Science, Reason, and Religion (New York,
NY: Basic Books, 2008); Amos Yong, ed., The Spirit Renews the Face of the Earth: Pentecostal Forays
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Conference on Religion and Science, ed. Carl S. Helrich, Goshen Conference on Religion and Science 6
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(Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press, 2006); John C. Polkinghorne, ‘The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos’, in 
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Eerdmans, 2006), 169–82; John C. Polkinghorne, ‘The Continuing Interaction of Science and Religion’,
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58
reality that goes beyond the purely material. Finally, in technology proper, the 
relationship of spirit to matter is understood to have implications for the use and 
development of technique.112 This attention to the use of spirit-language in technology 
will enable us, in the next chapter, to analyze the pictures of spirit that are assumed by 
technology. In other words, we will finally be able to sketch out the implicit 
pneumatology within technology.
SPIRIT IN RELIGION-AND-SCIENCE
Though the exact nature of the link between science and technique is itself a cause
for debate, it is clear that science and technique are related in some way. Is technique 
simply “applied science”? Often techniques have been developed without a scientific 
understanding of how they work, while modern science would be impossible if it were 
not for the technical apparatuses used in experiments and for measurement. So then, does
science produce technique, or does technique produce science? These questions reveal 
the complexity of the relationship between science and technique. Yet, despite the 
ambiguity of the precise nature of the relationship, it is clear that science and technique 
are related. As a result, the recent introduction of spirit into questions of religion-and-
science undoubtedly has implications for technology.
The introduction of spirit into science is, in many ways, an unexpected 
development. The materialistic presuppositions of science make it very difficult to speak 
60; see also Michael Northcott, ‘BP, the Blowout and the Bible Belt: Why Conservative Christianity 
Does Not Conserve Creation’, The Expository Times 122, no. 3 (2010): 117–26.
112 David F. Noble, The Religion of Technology: The Divinity of Man and the Spirit of Invention (New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 4; Richard G. Wilkinson and Kate Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why 
More Equal Societies Almost Always Do Better (London: Allen Lane, 2009).
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of God at work in the world: the scientific method requires a determinative cause-and-
effect world in order to make sense, while empiricism devalues the intangible. Yet recent 
developments in mathematical and theoretical physics seem to open a door for a plausible
supernatural being whose existence is nevertheless consistent with modern Western 
science. For scientists who want to maintain a theistic worldview, these developments 
offer an attractive possibility for harmonizing science and religion.
The key feature of these developments is summarized by John Polkinghorne as 
intrinsic uncertainty or unpredictability.113 Within the paradigm of Newtonian physics, the
world operated according to laws which were, in principle if not in detail, knowable. 
Where uncertainty in calculations existed, it was caused by an inability to measure 
precisely. In principle, though, everything could be predicted if one were only to know 
the exact location of every particle in the universe and its direction and speed of 
movement. The shift in science to quantum physics involved a corresponding shift 
toward epistemological openness. The discovery of quantum uncertainty described in 
mathematical language a level of reality in which only the speed or the location of a 
subatomic particle could be known. As such, it was seen to be logically impossible to 
know all of the details required in order to accurately predict the operation of the 
universe. Reality became, in theory as well as in practice, unpredictable.
The shift to quantum physics caused the scientific community to pay attention to 
the unpredictability encountered in other domains. Quantum unpredictability applied at 
the level of subatomic particles, but then Henri Poincare's uncertainty principle made a 
similar claim at the level of atoms and larger objects, popularized as “the butterfly 
113 Polkinghorne, ‘The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos’, 174–175, 177–179.
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effect.” The number of factors influencing any given object is so immense that accurate 
prediction is practically impossible. The smallest event, such as the movement of air 
caused by a butterfly's wings, could potentially “cause” a hurricane. Similar conclusions 
came out of systems theory: systems which began in a chaotic state were found to 
organize themselves into patterns that could not be explained by the rules governing the 
system. In biology too, the effects of higher levels of complexity on lower levels have 
challenged the dominance of classical empirical reductionism, which saw the causal 
chain moving from bottom to top rather than from top to bottom.
All of this has lead Polkinghorne, among others, to suggest that reality may be 
comprised of more than just energy. The revolution in physics caused by Einstein's 
discovery of the speed of light as E=mc2 demonstrated the interchangeability of matter 
and energy. Previously, all reality was thought to consist of just two “substances” – 
matter and energy; Einstein's formula reduced known reality to just one “substance” in 
two forms. Yet the discoveries noted above complicate this picture. As a result, some 
scientists are now suggesting that information may represent a second “substance” of 
reality which is just as intrinsic and foundational for understanding the operation of the 
universe as energy. The importance of information may represent a quantum leap at yet 
another level.
If one is looking for a scientific explanation for the Christian idea of the Spirit of 
God, then it seems that intrinsic uncertainty is a likely location. Intrinsic uncertainty 
grants to the universe a level of contingency which allows for the existence of a 
supernatural being. An even bolder approach claims that the Spirit of God can be 
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conceived of as “active information.”114 Assuming that information is a causal factor 
parallel to energy, this becomes an attractive way to account for the activity of God in a 
materialistic universe. What makes both of these proposals work is the scientific 
hypothesis that reality requires explanations beyond those which science, even in 
principle, can provide. Hence, there is nothing to stop one from attributing those 
explanations to God. Of course, intrinsic uncertainty and causal information can never 
“prove” the existence of God; it can merely make belief in God not incredible. There is a 
family resemblance between this rhetorical strategy and the now discredited “God of the 
gaps,” and Polkinghorne intentionally uses the term, “spirit of the gaps” for similar effect.
Yet he claims that the move rests on stronger philosophical foundations, since the “gaps” 
in question are no longer merely temporary holes in our knowledge, which may be filled 
in by more research, but are considered intrinsic to the nature of reality. The “spirit of the 
gaps” may then be the causal link between a transcendent (immaterial) God and material 
reality.
It is telling that scientists such as Polkinghorne seek to include the Spirit of God 
in this way. Though the understanding of “spirit” that is used by these scientists is muddy
at best, the impulse to include spirit in science (and thereby connect spirit to technique) is
compelling. Something about the language of spirit seems appropriate to describe the 
activity of a God who is not strictly required by science. Following these same markers, 
Stuart Kauffman, a biologist and an atheist, argues for a recovery of the “sacred.” 
Acknowledging the problems with such a recovery, he admits:
114 Ibid., 177–178.
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The very notion that we might choose to reinvent the sacred may be too 
threatening to embrace, or may seem pointless to billions of people of 
faith, or equally to secular humanists: indeed, it is important to realize that 
for millions if not roughly a billion of those of us who do not believe in a 
Creator God, we the secular children of the Enlightenment often feel that 
the very words sacred and God are utterly corrupted.115
Yet Kauffman finds having a name for the creativity in the universe to be helpful and, for 
lack of a better term, he is willing to name it “God.”
I believe we need to find a global spiritual space that we can share across 
our diverse civilizations, in which the sacred becomes legitimate for us all,
and in which we can find a natural sense of God that we can share to a 
substantial extent whatever our religious convictions.116
It seems that “God” or “sacred” add something to our understanding of reality that pure 
science does not deliver. Borgmann describes this element as “grace” or “contingency.”117
SPIRIT IN ECOLOGICAL DISCOURSE
Ecological discourse approaches nature through science but also through the 
lenses of ethics, poetry, and human spirituality. Because ecological discourse and/or 
ecotheology are often highly pneumatological, their conceptions of spirit are often much 
more developed than those of science. Yet the relationship to technique is often left 
unexplored. How is spirit-language used in ecology, and what are the technological 
connections?
Killing Spirit: Anthropocentricism
Theological reflection on nature for most of the past fifty years has centred around
the criticisms in Lynn White, Jr.'s article, “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological 
115 Kauffman, Reinventing the Sacred, 282–283.
116 Ibid., 283.
117 Borgmann, ‘Contingency and Grace in An Age of Science and Technology’.
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Crisis.” In this seminal essay, White argued that the current ecological crisis was the 
result of uniquely Christian attitudes toward nature. White blamed, in particular, the 
anthropocentricism of the Genesis creation stories as one source of these attitudes.
God had created Adam and, as an afterthought, Eve to keep man from 
being lonely. Man named all the animals, thus establishing his dominance 
over them. God planned all of this explicitly for man's benefit and rule: no 
item in the physical creation had any purpose save to serve man's 
purposes. And, although man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part 
of nature: he is made in God's image.118
Furthermore, these attitudes had come to dominate not only Christian culture, but all 
industrial society.
Our science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes toward 
man's relation to nature which are almost universally held not only by 
Christians and neo-Christians but also by those who fondly regard 
themselves as post-Christians. Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates 
around our little globe. Despite Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of 
the natural process. We are superior to nature, contemptuous of it, willing 
to use it for our slightest whim.119
White also implicated Christian deprecation of spirit as having an important role to play.
To a Christian a tree can be no more than a physical fact. The whole 
concept of the sacred grove is alien to Christianity and to the ethos of the 
West. For nearly 2 millennia Christian missionaries have been chopping 
down sacred groves, which are idolatrous because they assume spirit in 
nature.120
White held that, in order to address the ecological crisis, we need to reimagine our 
relationship to nature, either with a new religion or with a new way of understanding our 
old religion. White, a professed “churchman” himself, seems to have preferred the latter 
option. Famously, in the last sentence of the article, White upheld St. Francis of Assisi as 
118 White, ‘The Historical Roots of Our Ecologic Crisis’, 1205.
119 Ibid., 1206.
120 Ibid.
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the ideal patron saint of ecologists. For White, spirit exists within nature to make it holy, 
and spirit-language functions to place limits on the appropriateness of human technical 
control.
Replacing Spirit: An Anthropology of “Stewardship”
White's challenge has been taken as a call to a new anthropology – a 
reinterpretation of the meaning of the imago Dei. This call has been answered most 
prominently by Barbour, who suggests three basic interpretations of humanity's 
relationship to nature: that of dominion, unity, or stewardship. Barbour argued that the 
traditional attitude had been that of dominion.121 Yet, dominion itself has largely been 
disfigured and displaced by an attitude of domination, which views technique as a 
liberator because it allows the imago Dei to exercise its will upon nature, as White 
described.122 On the other end of the spectrum, the attitude of unity emphasizes 
humanity's involvement with and in nature.123 For that reason, the attitude of unity views 
technique as a threat.124 Mediating the poles of domination and unity is the attitude of 
stewardship.125
Attendant to stewardship is a recognition that technology is value neutral: 
it is neither intrinsically good (i.e., liberator) nor evil (i.e., threat), but 
instead a powerful instrument that can be used for either good or evil, or 
both. Technology is subject to, and expressive of, social power.126
Barbour proposed that St. Benedict, whose Rule ensured that the monastics remained 
121 Russell, ‘Five Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology from a Christian Perspective’, 151.
122 Ian G. Barbour, Technology, Environment, and Human Values (New York, NY: Praeger, 1980), 13–14.
123 Ibid., 18ff.
124 Russell, ‘Five Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology from a Christian Perspective’, 152.
125 Barbour, Technology, Environment, and Human Values, 24–25.
126 Russell, ‘Five Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology from a Christian Perspective’, 153.
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involved in both worldly work (technique) and spiritual work (prayer), should be the 
model for our interaction with nature, rather than St. Francis. For Barbour, the Spirit of 
God is the Creator of Life, and other spirit-language, which refers primarily to the human
spirit or imago Dei, functions to sanctify human technical work while simultaneously 
recognizing its ability to be misused for evil and calling it into the service of the good.
Saving Spirit: Soteriology
Steven Studebaker's analysis displays a family resemblance to White's when he 
offers the distinction between common grace/general revelation and special 
grace/revelation as a cause for pentecostal-evangelical disinterest in ecology.127 The 
problem for evangelicals, Studebaker posits, is not so much a misguided anthropology 
(White's argument) as a deficient soteriology, in which creation as general revelation is 
inconsequential for salvation and therefore expendable. The solution, for Studebaker, is 
to view creation as one of the spheres of Spirit's redemptive activity.
A pneumatological and unified theology of grace that takes the Spirit’s 
work in creation and redemption in comprehensive terms provides a way 
to see creation care as a dimension of Christian formation and 
sanctification. Creation care is a pneumatological participation in the 
eschatological redemptive mission of the Triune God and, as such, it is a 
dimension of Christian formation.128
Studebaker's purpose is to advocate for creation care, so he does not offer an analysis of 
technique. However, he implies in his examples and anecdotes that the care of creation 
occurs primarily through individual (consumer) ethics, which are to be guided by 
spiritual formation in the church. Studebaker sees the Spirit of God as actively at work in 
127 Studebaker, ‘The Spirit in Creation’.
128 Ibid., 956.
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salvation history, and uses spirit-language to identify areas in which humans may 
participate with God in that salvation.
Using Spirit: Ecological Pragmatism
Observing these kinds of arguments, Michael Northcott cautions against the 
pragmatic use of theology for ecological ends. As Northcott describes it, it has been 
difficult to convince certain segments of the population a) that an environmental crisis 
exists and b) to do anything about it. In some cases, when these populations are seen to 
be religiously motivated, theology has been utilized as an avenue into the problem. 
[M]ost of those who engage and promote the religion-ecology dialogue do 
so from a pragmatic belief that it represents a way of involving non-
experts in conservation, and a way of drawing religious impulses into a 
science-informed project that does not involve traditional religious 
belief.129
Yet this approach has not been successful precisely because it fails to understand the 
inter-related nature of religious convictions.
Pragmatic attempts to engage religion in the scientific conservation effort 
miss the ideational origins of the ecological crisis in the late medieval 
theology of mechanism and in the modern scientific worldview which it 
birthed. They also miss the deep implication of modern capitalism in this 
worldview.... Without a challenge to these seminal origins of the 
ecological crisis the conservation enterprise – whether or not it is hitched 
to religious communities – lacks cultural purchase. It remains, as Wendell 
Berry observes, a sideline; an attempt by environmentalists to separate out 
parts of nature – and of human community – from the mechanistic drive of
industrial capitalism while leaving the beast fundamentally untamed and 
still at large.130
Northcott's argument suggests that conservation requires not only a reinterpretation of the
imago Dei, but a reconception of nature as something beyond human control – a gift, not 
129 Northcott, ‘BP, the Blowout and the Bible Belt’, 124.
130 Ibid., 124–125.
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“natural capital.” For Northcott, spirit is the source of life for all creatures, and spirit-
language functions to limit the appropriateness of human technical control.
Resurrecting Spirit: Ecotheology and Panentheism
George Hendry's Theology of Nature is notable because it characterizes the 
“science of nature” as one of four approaches to nature that also include the mystery of 
nature, the religion of nature, and the philosophy of nature. This de-privileging of the 
scientific approach is one of the keys to Hendry's project: the development of a theology 
of nature. For Hendry, a theology of nature is not a theological account of (scientific) 
nature; rather, a science of nature is one way to understand the theological Creation. It is 
this relativizing of the scientific that gives Hendry's theology its unique perspective, but it
also means that, like Studebaker's, no explicit theology of technique is given. Instead, 
Hendry proposes a relation to nature that is explicitly incarnational and pneumatological: 
the Christian participates with Christ, through the Spirit of God, in the suffering of 
creation.131
Mark Wallace's Fragments of the Spirit represents post-modern eco-theology, and 
especially highlights the role that spirit plays in recent theologies of nature. Wallace takes
a panentheist position when he portrays spirit as incarnated in creation, or as a life-form 
who inhabits and sustains all other forms of life. Consequently, Wallace urges his readers 
to understand ecological destruction as both “ecocide” and “deicide.” Though he does not
offer an explicit theology of technique, technique plays a role in the prospect of deicide, 
according to his portrayal, by enabling humans to consume more than their share of 
131 George Stuart Hendry, Theology of Nature (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1980), 211ff.
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nature (which is transformed by technique into a “resource”) and disrupting our sense of 
identity with nature.132
In ecotheology and panentheism, spirit is not simply the source of nature, it dwells
alongside or within nature. Spirit-language therefore functions to place limits on the 
appropriateness of human technical manipulation of nature.
SPIRIT IN SOCIAL CRITICISM
Social criticism is another way to view the implicit pneumatology in technology. 
As with theologies of nature, both religious and non-religious social criticism make 
frequent use of the category of spirit, indicating that spirit encompasses or describes an 
aspect of reality which is appropriate and useful to social criticism. Yet, as with scientific 
discourse, spirit is often used as a generic category which includes all non-material 
reality.
Non-Religious Social Criticism
One of the key issues identified by recent social criticism is the expanding 
influence of materialism. Materialism, characterized as an overemphasis on physical 
objects, is seen to devalue intangibles like emotion, relationships, and attitudes. Under 
both Marxist and capitalist materialism, the person suffers because of a lack of things. 
Both Marxism and capitalism are strategies for maximizing happiness through the 
procurement of things. Each attempts to solve the problem of human suffering on a 
purely material level, and therein lies their failure.
132 Wallace, Fragments of the Spirit, 135.
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Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett seek to locate the source of happiness not in 
the absolute standard of living conditions, but in the relative standard of equality. In their 
study, The Spirit Level, they use measurable markers of happiness, such as longevity, 
health, birth rates, infant mortality, and rates of young, single mothers, to show that 
inequality has more of an effect on happiness and “the good life” than the absolute 
(material) standard of living. Moreover, the positive effects of equality benefit those in 
every strata of society, not just the poor.133 The value of an increased standard of living 
achieved by advanced capitalist technique is thus relativized by the hierarchical 
stratification of a technicized society.
William Greider also forms his argument around the idea of the “soul” of 
capitalism, which he regards as the generation of wealth. The success of capitalism's 
model of wealth generation is the reason why capitalism has emerged as the dominant 
economic system globally and is virtually unquestionable. Indeed the apparent success of 
capitalism has persuaded progressives and conservatives alike to place traditionally 
sacred domains under the control and logic of markets. Ecological destruction must be 
mitigated by “cap-and-trade” market mechanisms which monetize pollution in order to 
make it real/relevant within an economic framework. Education and healthcare are 
increasingly managed not by principles of justice and equality, let alone mercy or 
empathy, but rather by supply and demand. Within the capitalist system, the only way to 
solve the problem is to “incentivize” the providers by adding more money to the system 
through privatization. The rights to genetic material “discovered” by corporate 
researchers are owned and licenced by private firms, since the financial “risk” of research
133 Wilkinson and Pickett, The Spirit Level.
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must be rewarded monetarily. The technical fix leads inexorably toward privatization and
the surrender of control to specialists and experts. What is therefore needed is not a 
reform of the system of capitalism, but a renewal/rebirth of its soul through the 
engagement of ordinary people. By this, Greider appears to mean that solidarity, 
collective action, and true engagement with the Other is required in order to create a 
society in which individuals are enabled to achieve self-realization.134
In Shop Class as Soulcraft, Matthew Crawford addresses the separation of 
thinking from doing.135 This separation leads to a “despiritedness” or loss of pride in one's
work. Doing is done without thinking, and thinking is done without doing. He argues for 
a reintegration of thinking and doing, as performed by the tradesman (at a lower level) 
and exemplified by the craftsman (at a higher level). The (re)unification of thinking and 
doing ennobles people's spirits and gives them a sense of pride and dignity. In this sense, 
Crawford's argument follows in the tradition of Heidegger in calling for the recovery of 
the value of art (craft, trade, skill) as a way, not merely of doing, but of knowing.
What these studies and others are finding is that criticism of the deepest social 
issues cannot succeed on purely materialistic grounds because the social systems being 
critiqued are the logical product of materialism. Though these authors do not work in a 
theological mode, their critiques take them beyond individual, isolated instances of 
injustice and cause them to address the spiritual/psychic aspects of social systems – the 
“soul” of institutions.
134 William Greider, The Soul of Capitalism: Opening Paths to a Moral Economy (New York, NY: Simon 
& Schuster, 2004), 330.
135 Crawford, Shop Class as Soulcraft.
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Religion-Based Social Criticism
William Stringfellow's writing on “the Powers” takes a similar position. 
Stringfellow's analysis is primarily historical-theological. According to Stringfellow, the 
biblical term “principalities and powers” refers to realities which, in current parlance, can
be identified as images, institutions, and ideologies. The Powers become demonic when 
they invert the natural (i.e., God-given) order of dominion and make human beings their 
servants rather than their masters (cf. Gen. 1-2). In this idolatrous inversion, the Powers 
ultimately serve death rather than God. When human beings worship and serve the 
Powers, they become servants of death.136
Walter Wink has continued this vein of thought with an exegesis of the biblical 
concept of the Powers. For Wink, the Powers are neither purely spiritual nor purely 
material. The Powers are “the inner aspects of material or tangible manifestations of 
power.”137 In a sense, the Powers exist at the nexus of material and spiritual reality. Mob 
spirit is not a spirit which exists “in the air” and then swoops down and inhabits a crowd 
of people; but it is also not the accumulated effects of people gathered together (reducible
to sociological/psychological factors).138 Rather, the Powers are created by God for good 
purposes, but, like all of creation, are fallen and subject to sin.
Spirit in religious social criticism represents a dimension of reality which is not 
reducible to matter or the accumulated effects of material causes. Spirit both creates and 
136 William Stringfellow, A Keeper of the Word: Selected Writings of William Stringfellow, ed. Bill Wylie-
Kellerman (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994); see also William Stringfellow, The Politics of 
Spirituality (Philadelphia, PA: Wipf & Stock, 2006).
137 Walter Wink, Naming the Powers: The Language of Power in the New Testament (Philadelphia, PA: 
Fortress Press, 1984), 104.
138 Ibid., 105.
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is created by institutions and structures. Spirit is not identical to the Spirit of God, but is 
rather the matrix in which the Spirit of God operates.
SPIRIT IN TECHNOLOGY PROPER
In the religion-and-science discourse, a connection between spirit and technique is
implied, but both of the concepts remain ambiguous. In theologies of nature, spirit takes 
on a more definite shape, while technique remains unclear. In social criticism, technique 
is addressed more specifically, but spirit becomes a murky catch-all. Very rarely is a 
relationship between a definite understanding of spirit and a specific picture of technique 
attempted.
Spirit and the Telos of the Natural World
Historically, a relationship between spirit and technique would have been much 
easier to conceptualize. According to two recent studies by Mitcham and Davis, the 
purpose of technique was addressed much more specifically in ancient Greek philosophy 
and culture.139 Both of these studies ask the question: why did Greek technique not 
develop at a corresponding rate to its science? (I would suggest that a similar question 
could be asked with regard to the development of Chinese technique.) One answer is that,
in a Greek worldview, techne was seen to be unworthy of development apart from 
specific ends derived from other concerns. While scientia could and ought to be sought 
for its own sake, a technical research institution – let alone a hackerspace or hacklab – 
would have seemed absurd. However, another answer is that the Greek concept of spirit 
139 Davis, Means Without End, 6–16; Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, 191–198.
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functioned as a limiting influence on the development of technique. For the Greeks, 
nature was both spiritual and material. The existence of spirit in the natural world gave 
nature as a whole and in its parts a telos independent from human purposes. Therefore, 
the appropriate use of techne involved a seeking out of the particular telos of the object. 
Mass-production would have been impossible in this view, because each object or 
product would have to be specially produced in dialogue with its own “spirit.”
In a Chinese context, Zhuangzi, a Daoist philosopher, gives us the story of the 
master carver:
Khing, the master carver, made a bell stand
Of precious wood. When it was finished,
All who saw it were astounded. They said it must be
The work of spirits.
The Prince of Lu said to the master carver:
“What is your secret?”
Khing replied: “I am only a workman:
I have no secret. There is only this:
When I began to think about the work you commanded
I guarded my spirit, did not expend it
On trifles, that were not to the point.
I fasted in order to set
My heart at rest.
After three days fasting,
I had forgotten gain and success.
After five days
I had forgotten praise or criticism.
After seven days
I had forgotten my body
With all its limbs.
“By this time all thought of your Highness
And of the court had faded away.
All that might distract me from the work
Had vanished.
I was collected in the single thought
Of the bell stand.
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“Then I went to the forest
To see the trees in their own natural state.
When the right tree appeared before my eyes,
The bell stand also appeared in it, clearly, beyond doubt.
All I had to do was put forth my hand
And begin.
“If I had not met this particular tree
There would have been
No bell stand at all.
“What happened?
My own collected thought
Encountered the hidden potential of the wood;
From this live encounter came the work
Which you ascribe to the spirits.”140
While Zhuangzi seems to be deconstructing his contemporary Chinese concept of spirit 
with this parable, he nevertheless maintains a sense of telos in the natural world. He 
highlights the role of intentionality and unique purpose, which is perceived after ritual 
fasting and meditation. So spirit in nature implied also a telos for nature, and the telos of 
nature then provided a natural limit to the manipulation of nature through technique.
SPIRIT AND THE BEING OF BEINGS
Among modern reflections on technique, the most explicit connection with spirit 
is made in Ignacio Gotz's Technology and the Spirit. For Gotz, spirit is inextricably 
connected with nature. Here, spirit functions not so much to provide a telos for nature, 
but to sanctify nature and all physical things. Even technique, in this conception, is 
wholly “natural” (because it involves the material world) and therefore a locus of the 
divine. In response to criticisms of technique, Gotz takes an instrumentalist view of 
140 Referenced by Mitcham in “Bibliographic Note II,” from ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, 
194–195. Text from Thomas Merton, The Way of Chuang Tzu (New York, NY: New Directions, 1965), 
110–111. See Chuang Tzu XIX, 10.
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technique, and argues that all problems caused by technique are really problems in the 
human heart. “The danger of technology is neither more nor less than the danger of any 
use we make of ourselves. We do not need technology to do evil.”141 It is humanity, rather
than technique, that needs to be limited. Accordingly, Gotz gives considerable attention 
to education and spirituality.
Gotz's approach to technique and spirit is explicitly Teilhardian. For Gotz, as for 
Teilhard de Chardin, the concept of spirit is a pluralist synthesis from among the world's 
religions and traditions.142 However, one of the criticisms of religious pluralism is that, 
because all traditions are equalized, pluralist theology belongs to no tradition. So, 
although Teilhard de Chardin was ordained as a Jesuit, it is difficult to tell what, if 
anything, is specifically Christian in his pneumatology. In a similar way, for Gotz, “Spirit 
consists in the radical openness or self-transcendence characteristic of human nature. It is
the basic possibility of a true human existence in time. It is opposed to thing, the Sartrean
in-itself, and to all facticity.”143 Presumably, he would argue that all truth and all religious
insight derives from God. Spirit and technique are both universal. Therefore, their 
character need not be derived from only one tradition. Yet streams within the Christian 
tradition do contain a specific pneumatology and cosmology. In particular, Gotz does not 
attempt to account for the Christian distinction between spirit or the spiritual and the 
Spirit of God. Gotz maintains that the “curse” of Genesis 2 refers exclusively to 
humanity, and that the rest of nature should not be considered “fallen.”
Gotz argues for a critical use of technique. Opposition to technique is misguided 
141 Ignacio Gotz, Technology and the Spirit (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 18.
142 For the influence of Teilhard de Chardin on Gotz, see the personal note, ibid., xiii–xiv.
143 Ibid., 54.
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because the use of technique is what makes us human. “Technology is basically how 
humans care about the Being of (technical as well as natural) beings. This has been the 
case since the earliest human beginnings, for without technology... we humans would not 
have come to be.”144 Gotz argues for a critical openness to technique which corresponds 
to a critical evaluation of our own motivations and desires. Problems associated with 
technique, in particular the expanding ability to dominate and destroy others, should be 
faced directly yet without demonizing technique itself, which produces a great amount of 
good as well.
For Gotz, the problems caused by technique require a spiritual response. Through 
education, a spirit should be inculcated in children and within society of attention to our 
surroundings. Gotz concludes with the following proposal:
We need to learn to appreciate this earthly life of ours, this technological 
life, to the point where we would think it a loss not to be technological. 
This is the task I envision for our schools, where an effort must be made to
teach children how to value their lives precisely because they are 
technological, and at the same time, through the spirit, how to gain a new 
appreciation of technology in all its manifestations.145
Gotz's proposal is an attempt to overcome what he perceives to be a dualism between 
matter and spirit – to transcend good and evil through a vision of openness to the beyond 
which is empowering rather than constricting.146
Spirit: Freedom and Life
The spirit is also an important aspect of Ellul's theology. The role of spirit in 
Ellul's thought often goes unappreciated – perhaps because it is overshadowed by his 
144 Ibid., 33.
145 Ibid., 121.
146 Ibid., 119–120.
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social critique. Yet it could be argued that all of his theology is self-consciously 
pneumatological. Indeed it has been argued that spirit is key to Ellul's theology as the 
realm in which truth as well as freedom exist.147 Ellul's work on technique is merely the 
negative half of his thought: clearing away human delusions of self-determination or self-
sufficiency, while the positive half is to emphasize the absolute sovereignty of God, who 
participates in history through the Spirit of God.148
For Ellul, technique is a determinative system, “the totality of methods rationally 
arrived at and having absolute efficiency (for a given stage of development) in every field
of human activity.”149 Human beings are not fated to be determined by technique, but 
when they submit to technique they become determined by a system which is radically 
closed and predictive. Thus submission to technique is the antithesis of human freedom. 
Paradoxically, the human desire to control the environment, to self-determination and 
self-importance, leads to determinism, the loss of freedom, and ultimately the loss of life.
The way out of this paradox, as Ellul sees it, is to accept ambiguity, 
indeterminacy, and inefficiency. Ellul describes this solution as the life of the Spirit of 
God.
[W]hen I speak of “life” I am not thinking of some esoteric mysticism or 
vitalistic theory of hermetic philosophy. I simply mean the expression of 
the Holy Spirit, working within us, expressing himself in our actual life, 
through our words, our habits, and our decisions. ... In the powerful 
presence of the Holy Spirit... we are bewildered because we are no longer 
147 Raymond Gozzi, ‘Jacques Ellul on Technique, Media, and the Spirit’, New Jersey Journal of 
Communication 8, no. 1 (2000): 79–90.
148 For a discussion of the two tracks in Ellul's thought and writing, see Marva Dawn, ‘Introduction’, in 
Sources & Trajectories: Eight Early Articles by Jacques Ellul That Set the Stage, trans. Marva Dawn 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 4–5. Though Ellul was a Reformed Calvinist, his discussion of 
human freedom vis-à-vis divine sovereignty is nuanced and complex. For a case study, see The Politics 
of God and the Politics of Man (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1972).
149 Ellul, The Technological Society, xxv.
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very sure about the way forward, which no longer depends upon us. The 
end, as well as the means, has been taken away from us, and we hesitate as
we look at this way which lies before us, whose end we cannot see; we 
have only one certainty, and that is the promise which has been made to us
of a certain order, which God guarantees: “Seek ye first His Kingdom and 
His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.”150
For Ellul, then, the choice is between living by the “spirit of the world,” which in the 
modern world is dominated by technique, and living by the Spirit of God. In concrete 
terms, it is the choice between being at the centre of one's own history by controlling 
events and accepting a role in a history which finds its centre in God.
CONCLUSION
Each of the fields of technology that I have explored understands spirit interacting
with technique in some way. My purpose here has not been to set up any particular 
conception of spirit as plausible, but rather to demonstrate the range of settings in which 
spirit-language is used, as well as the fundamental differences between these conceptions 
of spirit. It should be obvious that spirit in religion-and-science discourse is not the same 
as spirit in social criticism. However, it is not necessary to agree with any particular 
perspective chosen in order to accept the basic insight that technique is in some way 
related to spirit. Theistic scientists may be correct that spirit is involved with science (and
technique), even though theologians may question the scientific picture of spirit. 
Theologies of nature may be correct in their perception of spirit in nature, even if there is 
room to argue about the level of spiritual immanence in nature, or the implications for 
technique. Social critics may be correct in their connection of spirit with social systems 
150 Jacques Ellul, The Presence of the Kingdom (New York, NY: Seabury Press, 1967), 95.
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and institutions, even though their pneumatology is often very general and 
undifferentiated – there is almost no concept of a “Holy Spirit” or of “evil/fallen spirits.” 
Finally, the discernment of spirit in theological discussions of technique, as few as they 
may be, is strong motivation to explore in more detail the involvement of spirit-language 
in technology. By highlighting these uses of spirit-language, I hope to have shown that 
spirit is an integral part of technology.
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CHAPTER 4:
DISCERNING THE SPIRITS
In the previous chapter, language about spirit was often undefined and ambiguous.
Descriptions of spirit are often contradictory or incongruent, but in a way this should be 
expected, for the Spirit of God blows where she will. On one hand, we try not to 
constrain the Spirit of God within doctrinal language, and on the other hand, we need to 
be able to “discern the spirits.” Not every spirit is the Spirit of God. Yet, for our purposes,
it was enough to show that technology uses spirit-language.
In this chapter, I will move further by identifying some of the features of spirit as 
used in the disciplines previously discussed, and I will apply a critical analysis to this 
language from a theological perspective. How does the spirit-language used by 
technology compare against orthodox pneumatology? This theological analysis will 
reveal the characteristics of spirit that are most often distorted by technology, and which 
must be corrected in order for technology's spirit-language to become aligned with 
orthodox pneumatology. My goal is to highlight some of the actual differences between 
the uses of “spirit” in the various discourses. More than just blindly enforcing orthodoxy 
however, setting out the characteristics of a “spirit” appropriate to Christian 
pneumatology will make a positive contribution to technology itself by suggesting 
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alternative ways for technology itself to speak about spirit. One consequence of this 
intrusion into technology by theology might be that technology, after reconsidering the 
spirit, may be induced to reconsider technique as well. Realizing that consequence, 
however, is beyond the scope of this project.
The four categories that I used in the previous chapter will be continued in this 
chapter, with one notable modification. In the previous chapter, I explored the use of 
spirit-language in religion-and-science, in ecology, in social criticism, and in technology 
proper. However, the view of technology proper came from ancient Greek mythology, 
Ignacio Gotz, and Jacques Ellul. In this chapter, I am not interested in comparing biblical 
pneumatology to the ancient Greek concept of spirit, so that discussion will not be 
developed. Furthermore, Ellul and Gotz are so dissimilar that it makes little sense to treat 
them together. Therefore the pneumatology of Gotz will be considered under the category
of religious pluralism, while the pneumatology of Ellul will be considered with the 
pneumatology of social criticism, to which it bears a close resemblance.
My goal is first to draw out the features of spirits, which are often confused with 
each other. Secondly, I want to analyze their resemblance and dissonance to the concept 
of spirit found in biblical traditions. In the process, several features of biblical spirits will 
be highlighted for their contrast with modern conceptions of spirit. Third, I will suggest 
ways in which these features of spirit found in the biblical traditions may impact the 
larger technological discourse.
There are many features of spirit that are appropriated by technologists – more 
than it would be possible to adequately treat here. The creativity of the Spirit of God is 
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used by some to suggest that human creativity in developing techniques is fundamentally 
“spiritual.” Likewise, the mystery and the open-endedness of the Spirit of God are used 
to justify developing techniques even when we are not sure how they will be used or 
what effect they will have. The “passability” of the Spirit of God is leveraged in support 
of the idea that harmful techniques do not merely damage the environment, but actually 
cause the suffering of God. Even the doctrine of kenosis is used – not to encourage 
human self-emptying and identification with those who suffer, as Paul does in Philippians
2, but to underwrite a view of historical progress that depends on technological 
development (without regard for those who suffer as a result). So the logic goes that the 
self-emptying of God and/or God's Spirit correlates to the filling up of humanity; the 
“death of God” corresponds to the coming-of-age of humanity.151
Many of these features of spirit are themselves the subject of theological dispute 
quite apart from their role in technology. For example, the relationship of the human 
spirit to the Spirit of God, is far from settled. Therefore, I have intentionally limited my 
exploration of technological pneumatology to features that are relevant to the discourse 
(e.g., to science, ecology, etc.) and are more-or-less settled theologically. In particular, I 
appeal to “biblical pneumatology” not in a biblical literalist mode, but as the basis for 
some minimum amount of common ground. Two of the main themes that emerge, which 
are relatively uncontroversial theologically, are the personhood and the freedom of the 
Spirit of God.
151 See Jacques Ellul, ‘Cain, the Theologian of 1969’, Katallagete: Be Reconciled 2, no. 1 Winter (1968): 
4–7.
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THE SPIRIT OF SCIENCE
As I have already shown, the justification for spirit-language in religion-and-
science discussions is based on newly developed understandings of intrinsic uncertainty, 
emergence theory, top-down causality, and other scientific macro-theories. The key 
contributors to this discussion from chapter 3 are John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, 
and Stuart Kauffman. There my interest was primarily in describing the theoretical 
foundations of a scientific understanding of spirit. Here, I would like to go one step 
further, and inquire into the consequences of these scientific understandings of spirit.
The spirit of science is, more often than not, a spirit of the gaps. The spirit 
functions as a device for harmonizing science and theology, by submitting the language 
of God to the grammar of science. In this way, the spirit of science is a project of 
Scientism, rather than of Christian theology.
The Spirit of Science: Materialist Pneumatology
Modern conceptions of spirit by the natural sciences encounter difficulties from 
two directions: the empiricist constraint, and a totalizing impulse. Owing to the empirical 
method, the natural sciences can only give consideration to material reality. Still, it is not 
the materialist a priori of science that causes difficulties. It is materialism in conjunction 
with the totalizing impulse of Scientism that reduces all of reality into scientific 
categories, rather than limit empirical science to one mode of knowledge among several. 
When the description of spirit is controlled by modern materialistic science, spirit comes 
to be understood as “quasi-material,” and the relationship between spirit and matter 
becomes too simple. As I am using it, quasi-materiality means that spirit can be 
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conceptualized by materialistic science – if not yet in reality, then at least in principle. 
Science takes over the dual roles of apophatic and cataphatic theology. Arthur Peacocke's 
“top-down causation” makes a positive statement about the relationship between spirit 
and science, while Polkinghorne's “spirit-of-the-gaps” uses a negative statement defining 
where empirical explanation cannot exist as the foundation for a role for spirit. So for 
both, God's nature is cast in terms of what is and is-not scientifically tenable.
The quasi-materiality of spirit is pervasive throughout religion-and-science 
discourse. For example, Polkinghorne states that there are two main strategies for 
speaking about spirit in the world. The first is to accept physical reductionism and not to 
speak about spirit at all, and the second is to subscribe to a platonic dualism that sees 
spirit and physicality as separate entities. Into this binary, Polkinghorne proposes that
one can adopt a third metaphysical strategy, based on appealing to those 
discoveries of science that have revealed the widespread presence of 
intrinsic unpredictabilities in physical process, and then seeing them as 
revealing aspects of the nature of the world that are capable of being given
metaphysical interpretation as signs of its possessing an openness to the 
future.152
For Polkinghorne, a spirit that is not amenable to scientific description is no spirit at all. 
Following this strategy, however, means that science is allowed to determine the 
objective world of “facts” while religion is relegated to the subjective world of 
“metaphysical interpretation.”
The same basic approach is taken by Peacocke, who advocates “top-down 
causality” as a solution to God's activity in a world which is nevertheless scientific.
[M]ight we not properly regard the world-as-a-whole as a total system so 
that its general state can be a 'top-down' causative factor in, or constraint 
152 Polkinghorne, ‘The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos’, 169.
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upon, what goes on at the myriad levels that comprise it? I suggest that 
these new perceptions of the way in which causality actually operates in 
our hierarchically complex world provides a new resource for thinking 
about how God could interact with that world. For it points to a way in 
which we could think of divine action making a difference in the world, 
yet not in any way contrary to those regularities and laws operative within 
the observed universe which are explicated by the sciences applicable to 
the level of complexity and organization in question.153
Peacocke suggests that God, as the top-down causative factor, might represent a 
“constraint upon” the system, rather than being constrained by the “myriad levels that 
comprise it.” In this way, Peacocke maintains that God would not be mechanistically 
determined by the constituent parts of reality, just as the human person is not understood 
to be determined simply by the constituent parts of the physical body. Yet, if spirit is 
identified with the top-down causative factor, then the language and logic of God has 
become subordinated to the language/logic of science. According to this scheme, God 
remains nominally transcendent of natural reality, but in fact the language of God has 
already been subordinated to the materialist grammar of Scientism.
The Spirit of Science: An Impersonal Spirit
One consequence of the quasi-materiality of spirit is that spirit becomes 
impersonal. The spirit is said to operate on the level of fields, subatomic particles, chaos, 
and causality itself. Can individual human beings have unique, personal experiences of 
this spirit? Here lies the double-edged sword of scientific discourse. Objectivity requires 
that phenomena be available for investigation irrespective of the investigator, but 
precisely this flattening and universalizing of experience seems to rule out the possibility 
153 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 158.
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of personal, unique experiences. How would one quantify the Comforter? By what 
criteria could we measure the activities of the Advocate? For a solution, Peacocke 
appeals to materialistic epistemology. For Peacocke, all brain activity is the result of 
extremely complex interactions of precisely the kinds of subatomic particles, chaos, and 
causality of which spirit is said to consist. Therefore, spirit does not need to mess with 
physical laws in order to produce the mystic's vision, grant the grieving “peace that 
passes all understanding,” or prompt a stranger's uncanny words of wisdom. These are all
experiences which take place in the mind, either our own or another's. Spirit merely 
“acts” by tweaking our perceptions, intuitions, and other mental states. Polkinghorne 
takes a similar approach to that of Peacocke when he claims that spirit possesses 
“context-sensitivity” or “encounter-sensitivity.”154 In these ways, people can have 
“personal” experiences of spirit.
The approaches of Peacocke and Polkinghorne can be credited with attempting to 
create room for persons to have subjective experiences of spirit, but a further question is 
whether spirit is a person itself. It may be the case that spirit is multifaceted enough to, 
like the proverbial elephant and the blind men, provide a unique experience to each 
person, but that does not mean that spirit itself is a person. The spirit described by 
Peacocke seems to be a mental field, producing mental states, while spirit described by 
Polkinghorne seems to be a force-field analogous to gravity or magnetism, a force which 
represents the active principle toward life (the so-called Anthropic Principle). How can 
such “fields” be understood as persons? Lying behind this question is really a question of 
154 John C. Polkinghorne and Michael Welker, Faith in the Living God: A Dialogue (Minneapolis, MN: 
Fortress Press, 2001), 71, 97. See also Polkinghorne, ‘The Hidden Spirit and the Cosmos’. 
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freedom vs. determinacy. Does spirit have a will? Can spirit, by its own will, make itself 
more present, more active, or more effective in certain times and places? Or is it a 
universal, a constant, maintaining the appearance of variation only as a response to 
changing external environmental conditions?155
It is hard to imagine a spirit that operates on the level of physical systems, but is 
constrained to act “not in any way contrary to those regularities and laws operative within
the observed universe,” as a person. Such a spirit cannot blow where she will. The 
freedom, the wildness, the untameability must simply be products of our limited 
perception – another way of naming the mystery of spirit. Yet, if we had the appropriate 
science, it seems that it would be possible to “map” the activity of spirit. There is no 
reason to suppose that this spirit possesses an active will which directs its activities 
according to its desires, rather than always in a consistent way. The materialist spirit must
be a lifeless force. Of course, if we choose to believe that this materialist spirit possesses 
characteristics of personhood, it is possible to do so. Yet this “person” essentially and in 
all important ways lacks agency, and, due to a totalizing empiricism, cannot “break 
through” to the physical or exert its will on the physical in any substantial way. So the 
“personhood” of spirit remains irrelevant for understanding the work of spirit.
The Spirit of Science: Totalizing Empiricism
Because the empiricism of the natural sciences is totalizing, a scientifically 
155 For example, gravity is a relatively weak force, which only feels strong when two objects of great mass
are placed near each other; though gravity is always “working,” it is only in such conditions that the 
influence of gravity becomes perceptible. As a result, gravitational force feels more or less strong in 
different places in the universe. If spirit were a force-field, then it would only appear to fluctuate, but 
would in fact be a constant.
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acceptable spirit must be experienced objectively. Objectivity means that this spirit can 
be discerned equally well by anyone, independent of their faith perspective. As such, the 
portrayals of spirit by Polkinghorne and Peacocke et al. are empiricist because they 
attempt to describe the work of spirit within the bounds of physics and biology, where 
physics or biology have become the dominant discourse. Physics describes a world with 
quantum uncertainty, and spirit is permitted to inhabit that space. Biology describes a 
world with top-down causality, and spirit is granted the status of the “top” top. Physics 
describes a world in which chaotic systems self-organize without any apparent necessary 
cause, and spirit is assumed to be that cause. This spirit is scientifically acceptable 
because, while it need not be given the name “spirit,” the evidence (or in this case, the 
lack of evidence) is there for all to examine.
When spirit is identified with scientific macro-theories such as quantum 
uncertainty or the anthropic principle, then, in practice, the people best able to discern 
spirit are physicists rather than ordinary, spiritually sensitive church-goers. Wherever 
science does not have an explanation, the theistic scientist can invoke the hidden and 
mysterious spirit. This spirit is revealed objectively in the lack of an explanation. In this 
way, the language of spirit is co-opted as a theological gloss for scientific Uncertainty, 
which now takes on metaphysical proportions. Natural scientists, regardless of religious 
conviction, then take on a priestly role in the new Scientism, for they are the ones who 
are best able to determine where the spirit is. Yet, in each of these cases, spirit is not 
strictly “necessary” – an atheistic or agnostic scientist need not assume such a spirit in 
order to make sense of the data. Rather, spirit is imported from religious discourse in 
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order to provide a link between theology and science.
Yet the move to describe a role for spirit in science is not only directed by science;
reasons exist for making this move that draw more on theological language and 
rationality. The incarnation demonstrates God's love of the material world. The universe 
is created to run according to certain observable principles, which exist independently of 
science, but which science is able to discover. Science is true – not independently, but 
because God created the same natural world that science investigates, and gave human 
beings minds and the ability to make tools with which to study it. In this way, the 
intrinsic goodness of Creation is what justifies science, even its methodological atheism. 
Yet the intrinsic goodness of Creation, when absolutized in this way, functions to 
legitimize an autonomous science. Thereafter, the success of science as an independent 
explanatory narrative produces the totalizing impulse which requires that all other 
discourses be subordinated to itself. Therefore, even when justified by theological 
statements, science when autonomized becomes Scientism. Totalizing empiricism cannot 
not produce a Grand Theory of Everything.
The Spirit of Science vis-à-vis Biblical Pneumatology
The function of pneumatology for totalizing empiricism is to provide a convenient
religious explanation for the problems of contingency and unpredictability – a literal deus
ex machina. This pneumatology describes an essentially static God, who at most works at
the extremely microscopic level within the limits of the laws of cause-and-effect. It is 
both reductionistic and materialistic. As Jordan Daniel Wood puts it, this approach to 
religion-and-science discourse
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co-opts and inverts the grammar of belief/faith itself by treating it as if it 
means the same kind of thing to believe in the laws of physics and to 
believe in the resurrection of Christ (even if in differing degrees). [It] 
largely ignore[s] what theologians themselves have said about the nature 
of faith, that belief in God and belief in other things are as fundamentally 
different as God is from creation.156
This approach succeeds from the perspective of totalizing empiricism, because it offers 
one more explanation, but it fails from the perspective of theology, because it distorts the 
meaning of the personhood of the Spirit of God. So Michael Welker asks, “how... can we 
avoid the conclusion that the Spirit is an amorphic and only so-called 'personality,' a 
chameleon that changes with each encounter and each context?”157 For an answer, Welker
himself appeals to biblical traditions. Yet, the biblical traditions to which Welker refers 
merely assume the personhood of the Spirit of God. They do not explain how spirit 
conceptualized materialistically can be a person, for they do not conceptualize spirit in 
that way. Biblical traditions cannot weigh in on the debate, because they are unaware of a
debate. The biblical traditions do not submit their language to the grammar of modern 
science.
A better way to move beyond a quasi-material spirit, in which spirit functions 
merely to explain gaps in the data discovered by the natural sciences, is demonstrated by 
Amos Yong. In his article, “Ruach, the Primordial Chaos, and the Breath of Life,” Yong 
recognizes the problem of harmonizing science and theology, but works at it from a 
different angle. Beginning from theology rather than science, he argues that “the 
156 Jordan Daniel Wood, ‘The Predicament of Belief – Clayton / Knapp’, Book Review, The Englewood 
Review of Books, 9 February 2012, http://erb.kingdomnow.org/the-predicament-of-belief-clayton-
knapp-feature-review/.
157 Michael Welker, ‘The Spirit in Philosophical, Theological, and Interdisciplinary Perspectives’, in The 
Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2006), 226.
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theologians in the conversation need to find ways of speaking more theologically without
undermining the discussion with the scientists.”158 Thus, he begins by describing Philip 
Clayton's theory of emergence and specifically Clayton's use of spirit-language. But Yong
then moves beyond Clayton's theory to fill out the picture of spirit from biblical and 
theological sources. Yong's revision of Clayton's pneumatology is then used to suggest 
some revisions in scientific thinking itself. Yong suggests that a pneumatological 
theology of creation can be more than just fill-in-the-gaps procedure, but rather can 
function to provide “theological legitimacy for the plurality of disciplines in the sciences,
even while it holds forth a kind of complementarity principle which anticipates the 
various disciplines each providing distinctive but essential perspectives on reality.”159 
Yong further suggests that pneumatology can facilitate a transformed relationship 
between the natural sciences and the psycho-social sciences.
[A] pneumatological theology of creation would reaccentuate the 
biological and especially psychological and humanistic sciences that risk 
being neglected in the theology-and-science conversation, which agenda is
often dictated by those engaged in the natural sciences.160
In this way, spirit is not simply outside of physical reality, as for Polkinghorne, Peacocke,
et al., but is actually outside of science itself. Rather, science belongs within the Spirit of 
God, and is called beyond itself by God's Spirit. Pneumatology then becomes the 
foundation for an adequate science.
Another way to move beyond the quasi-materiality of spirit is modelled by 
158 Amos Yong, ‘Ruach, the Primordial Chaos, and the Breath of Life: Emergence Theory and the 
Creation Narratives in Pneumatological Perspective’, in The Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and 
Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 201.
159 Ibid., 203.
160 Ibid.
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Donald York and Anna York, who suggest that Spirit/Wisdom interfaces with science, or, 
more specifically, with evidence, in the form of “knowledge, discernment, truth, and 
beneficial results.”161 In this view, the validity of science itself becomes contingent on 
spirit. It recognizes that what is considered scientific “knowledge” and “truth” is often 
incomplete or even false and it urges humility and patient waiting upon spirit as an 
antidote to the hubris of Scientism. In contrast to Polkinghorne and Peacocke, this 
approach makes religion less dependant on science to set the agenda, and indeed inverts 
the relationship by having Spirit/Wisdom be the one to draw the sciences along in a 
journey of discovery. It is also explicitly technological in its demand for beneficial 
results:
While we assume that science and technology are beneficial, we may 
discover that the results are ambiguous, as we have with atomic energy 
and a host of other scientific and technological innovations. Perhaps the 
key to Spirit/Wisdom is that it is... actively seeking to bring forth as much 
fullness of its qualities as is possible in particular times and settings and 
also over very long periods of time in a great variety of contexts.162
So not all technical innovation is the result of the Spirit of God, but only that which 
produces beneficial results, which can sometimes only be determined over a long period 
of time. “Wisdom is not achieved lightly nor cheaply and... there are few who attain it. 
Those who want Wisdom must cultivate certain qualities; they must be humble, willing to
listen, honest, just, persevering, and committed to waiting and watching at Sophia's 
doors.”163
161 Donald G. York and Anna York, ‘The Spirit in Evidence: Stories of How Decisions Are Made’, in The 
Work of the Spirit: Pneumatology and Pentecostalism, ed. Michael Welker (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2006), 217.
162 Ibid., 219.
163 Ibid.
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Stanley Stowers presents yet another way of conceiving of the relationship 
between matter and spirit, derived from ancient and biblical sources. Stowers notes that, 
for some ancients, moral qualities were tied to physical materials, so that the 
particularities of one's substance was significant. The source of the significance of matter 
was pneuma. So, for example, in Pauline thought, “Those in Christ are literally of the 
same stuff. All share the very same pneuma, Christ's. It would be a wrong turn, however, 
to in modern fashion separate substance from quality, the spiritual (in the modern sense) 
from the material.”164 Rather, both technical abilities and moral virtues are characteristics 
of pneuma, which can be disturbed by physical events. This is a worldview in which 
one's “blood” may determine one's character, even while the blood remains a physical 
substance. (For example, someone may have noble blood or common blood or traitor's 
blood, the blood of Abraham or gentile blood.) And yet there are ways to change one's 
nature, including ceremonial adoption by another, whose blood is then attributed to the 
adoptee, or the ingestion of blood from another, as in certain sacred rituals. What is 
notable in this pneumatology is that the line between the physical and spiritual is messy, 
if it exists at all.
Implications for Technology: The Conversation Between the Spirit of Science and 
Biblical Pneumatology
Biblical pneumatology has important implications for technology. Technique is a 
rational way of performing actions in a conception of reality that is empirical and 
materialistic. However, if reality were understood as open to non-materialistic aspects – 
164 Stanley Stowers, ‘Matter and Spirit, or What Is Pauline Participation in Christ?’, in The Holy Spirit: 
Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed. Eugene F. Rogers (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 97.
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if, as Stowers contends that biblical traditions assumed, physical substances were 
endowed with spiritual qualities – then the appropriateness of technique would need to be
questioned. The idea of mass production cannot co-exist with the idea of the sacred 
grove. As Borgmann puts it, technology, “an approach to reality that aims at transparency
and control,” undermines an understanding of reality that includes such concepts as 
contingency and grace.165 Conversely then, the idea of a non-materialistic Spirit of God 
(who mediates grace in a contingent world) challenges the appropriateness of submitting 
all of our activity to the logic of technique.
THE SPIRIT OF RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
The spirit of science is an important conception of spirit in modern times, but it is 
not the only spirit. Another important conception of spirit comes out of a perspective that 
can be called “religious pluralism.” Here I refer to the use of spirit-language in 
technology proper, as found in Technology and the Spirit, by Ignacio Gotz, which I 
explored in chapter 3. Gotz writes in a Teilhardian mode, which can be described as 
Christian religious pluralism. So in this section, I want to examine some of the 
characteristics of the spirit of religious pluralism.
The spirit of religious pluralism is an indistinct spirit. It is an amalgam of 
concepts from among the world's religions. Spirit in this discourse is meant to describe an
openness to the transcendent and to the other, but it is also a way of speaking about the 
common essence in all things. Spirit blurs boundaries – the boundary between this and 
that, between us and them, between me and you. It is a transgressive spirit, dissolving the 
165 Borgmann, ‘Contingency and Grace in An Age of Science and Technology’, 6.
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boundaries that maintain isolation and independence. In this sense, spirit is communal. 
But it is also the spirit of nature, of matter, and of God. To be spiritual is to live a certain 
kind of life rather than to undergo a fundamental ontological shift (e.g., “to be saved,” or 
“born of spirit”) or to be in a particular relationship (e.g., with God).
The pluralist spirit is experienced both subjectively and universally. Unlike the 
spirit of science, where the experience of spirit must be objectively verifiable through the 
application of a rigid methodology, the spirit of pluralism is experience through a 
subjective perception. However, like the spirit of science, the spirit of pluralism is 
conceived of as universal. The experience of spirit is available to all who seek it, 
regardless of religious conviction. Indeed, by definition the pluralist is constrained to 
view all claims to spiritual experience as more or less equivalent, with little regard to the 
content of that experience or the ethical imperatives that follow from that experience. As 
a result, the concept of spirit that emerges is indistinct and general, so that it is unclear 
what this spirit actually does.
The Spirit of Religious Pluralism: Materialist Pneumatology
The pluralist spirit is not a “thing” or a “principle” as it is in scientific discourse. 
Rather, this spirit is a property of things. Spirit is “inside” of matter itself. In this way, it 
is similar to the spirit of biblical traditions described by Stowers above, but not identical. 
For Gotz and Teilhard de Chardin, spirit is not the “quality” of physical substances so 
much as the “inner being” (or essence) of material reality. For this understanding of 
spirit, there does not seem to be any difference between the human spirit and the spirit of 
nature, let alone between the spirit of one human being and of the next. Spirit exists 
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fundamentally in all things, or, in other words, is the fundamental existence of all things. 
So when it is said that someone “has spirit,” the pluralist would be constrained not to see 
this as a statement about a particular person's unique status with regard to spirit. Non-
human beings can also exhibit a certain spirit: art may be spirited, a certain tree or 
mountain may have spirit, or, as Gotz argues, a computer may even be spiritual. In these 
cases, spirit does not seem to refer to the relative presence of spirit in an object, but rather
to the subjective ability of the speaker to discern the basic essence – the commonality – 
in the object. Though spirit may be more or less easy to discern in some people or 
objects, spirit itself is universally present in all things – it is objectively there.
Because spirit is universal, “having spirit” or being spiritual does not mean having
a spirit as opposed to not having a spirit, but rather means being conscious of spirit. This 
consciousness manifests itself in several ways, for example: as increased awareness of 
relationship or community, based on a sense of commonality with all things, since all 
things are spirit; as courage, based on the subordination of the self to the collective; or as 
serenity, drawn from an awareness of one's continuity with all reality. There could be, of 
course, many more examples. When the pluralist refers colloquially to a person “having 
spirit,” it means, depending on the context, that they have a certain quality of life: e.g., 
courage, openness or vulnerability, integrity, etc. So Gotz can say that “Spirit consists in 
the radical openness or self-transcendence characteristic of human nature. It is the basic 
possibility of a true human existence in time. It is opposed to thing, the Sartrean in-itself, 
and to all facticity.”166 Spirit in this sense is understood as a moral attribute.
166 Ibid., 54.
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The Spirit of Religious Pluralism: An Impersonal Spirit
While the pluralist concept of spirit should be credited with valuing the person, 
the pluralist spirit itself is not a person any more than the wind is. An individual may 
have a personal experience of the wind, and may experience through the wind a sense of 
connection with all other individuals who also experience the wind, but the wind itself is 
neither a person nor personal. Similarly, spirit as “radical openness” or “self-
transcendence characteristic of human nature” is not a person, even though it might be 
said that it is fundamental to personhood. The spirit cannot move independently, cannot 
exert a will. It is no more personal than the spirit of science.
The Spirit of Religious Pluralism: The Unifier
Because spirit is the “inside” of all material reality, it is what connects all material
reality. Spirit seems to be a way of saying that we are all made up of the same “stuff,” 
despite our apparent physical differences. This spirit does not need to exist “objectively;” 
it does not need to be “discovered.” It is enough for spirit to be assumed by religious 
pluralism because it justifies the humanist project. In this way, it functions like the spirit 
of science to fill a conceptual gap, which allows the pluralist project to work. “Spirit” 
becomes a reification for “the intrinsic unity of all things,” which is crucial to the 
pluralist project.
In this way, modern epistemological pluralism, especially the kind that says that 
all religious traditions are merely different approaches to “one” truth, is actually closer to 
the monism of pre-Socratic Greek philosophy, which held that all substances are really 
made up of one substance, and against which pluralism was originally cast. In the case of 
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the pneumatology of Gotz, this pluralism becomes even closer to pre-Socratic monism in 
that all physical reality, which it is granted is genuinely different, is at the core of its 
Being the same thing: spirit. So pluralism means that genuine difference dissolves back 
into undifferentiated unity.
The Spirit of Religious Pluralism: An Uncritical Spirit
Because a major goal of religious pluralism is to promote harmonious social 
relations by appealing to our essential unity rather than highlighting differences, the spirit
of religious pluralism reduces our capacity to engage in critical evaluation. Difference, 
for the pluralist, is merely superficial, and focusing on differences is dangerous for social 
harmony. Why, then, should we exert ourselves in analysis of differences? And if we do 
go so far as to describe such differences, spirit provides us with no resources for 
preferring one particularity over another – for regarding one thing as “better” than 
another. The spirit offers no way to make judgements.
The universality of the pluralist spirit produces a non-judgemental openness to 
reality. Since all reality is spiritual, there is nothing that is intrinsically bad. Human 
ambition itself is an outworking of spirit, and is not to be checked or inhibited. If there is 
such a thing as an “evil spirit” for this pneumatology, it would seem to be only an attitude
that is closed-off to spirit, or a blocking of human progress toward unity.
The Spirit of Religious Pluralism vis-à-vis Biblical Pneumatology
The concept of spirit that is invoked by biblical traditions differs from the pluralist
spirit in that it is not the only spirit that exists. While in some instances the biblical 
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traditions conceive of God as omniscient and omnipresent, the Spirit of God is still “sent”
and “departs” from places. The Spirit of God is also distinguished from the spirit of this 
world and from “evil” spirits. In short, just as Jesus was one human among many, spirit 
seems to be a kind of thing, of which the Spirit of God is one instance.
One consequence of a biblical conception of spirit is that it allows, and indeed 
encourages, critical evaluation. While the pluralist spirit seems to discourage criticism in 
favour of a flat sameness, the unity that is evoked by a biblical concept of spirit is 
complex. It is a unity on the far side of diversity, achieved as a result of difficult struggles
and conflicts, rather than by avoiding them. There is good reason for the pluralist-
humanist to avoid such a concept of spirit. At times throughout history, the need to 
struggle for unity has been taken as an imperative to annihilate the other – to create unity 
by destroying diversity. However, this is not the kind of unity that the Spirit of God 
creates on the far side of conflict, but simply another way to avoid conflict – by removing
difference, rather than working through it.
Implications for Technology: The Conversation Between the Spirit of Religious 
Pluralism and Biblical Pneumatology
A biblical concept of spirit has implications for technology. If the Spirit of God is 
conceived of as one spirit among many, some of which are “anti-God,” then it is not 
enough simply to note the spiritual nature of technique. The theologian must evaluate the 
ways in which the spirit of technique is aligned with the Spirit of God and the ways in 
which it is not. In particular, one would be directed to look at the essence of technique as 
the human impulse to control the environment vis-à-vis the divine mandate to “be 
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humble” and to “submit” to others rather than control them, a mandate which finds its 
ultimate model in the willingness of God to submit to death at the hands of humanity.
THE SPIRIT OF ECOLOGY
The spirit of science and of religious pluralism are two major conceptions of spirit
in modern times. The spirit of ecology is less widely known, but is still important, given 
the modern evironmental crisis. In the previous chapter, I explored the use of spirit-
language in ecological discourse. Some of the writers were Lynn White Jr., Steven 
Studebaker, George Hendry, and Michael Northcott. However, the most explicit 
pneumatology in an ecological mode came from Mark Wallace. Wallace's pneumatology 
is similar to other ecological pneumatologies (e.g., those of Kathryn Tanner, Sallie 
McFague, and Jurgen Moltmann) in its appeal to panentheism. In this section, I examine 
some of the implicit characteristics of the (panentheist) spirit of ecology.
The spirit of ecology is in many respects similar to the spirit of religious 
pluralism, as the inner essence of all reality, except that the ecological implications of 
universal connectedness are highlighted. This difference in emphasis is significant, 
however. Whereas for Gotz the computer and other technical devices should be 
considered the spiritual equals of any tree or mountain, for eco-pneumatology (for 
example, some ways of articulating panentheism) the natural is privileged, and violations 
of the natural are seen as violence against spirit. Where for the pluralist strip-mining, 
pollution of rivers, and destruction of ozone might be considered regrettable acts of 
“closed-off-ness” to spirit, for the ecologist these are seen as ecocide, even deicide.
The ecological emphasis reveals an important weakness of the pluralist 
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conception of spirit. In all likelihood, the pluralist would support an environmentally 
conscious ethic, but would be unable to consistently explain why one should prefer trees 
to bulldozers. So an eco-pneumatology is able to say more with respect to technical 
devices, since the devices of modern society cannot be produced without some natural 
destruction, which ecological pneumatologies would describe as ecocide or deicide. 
Pluralist and ecological pneumatologies are further differentiated when human violence 
against other humans is considered. Though acts of war definitely involve a deficient 
sense of the commonality of all people (as a pluralist pneumatology emphasizes), to place
a lack of (awareness of) spirit at the heart of the matter seems too placid and offers few 
solutions, with little motivation to discover such solutions. According to the logic of 
pluralism a la Teilhard de Chardin and Gotz, human life is not more spiritual (read: 
valuable) than the humus, nor even than fighter-jets, except perhaps in the ability of 
humans to reflect on their own spirituality.167 Ecological pneumatologies have an 
advantage at this point, for they possess a rationale for differentiating between the natural
and the artificial.
The Spirit of Ecology: Universal Experience of Nature
The experience of the ecological spirit is a subjective experience that is 
universally available but not verifiable. As with the pluralist spirit, there is no “proof” 
that an objective spirit exists within living things, and the experience of such a spirit 
cannot consistently be made available apart from a personal disposition. There is no 
methodology; rather, the experience of such a spirit derives from a subjective sense of 
167 See Gotz's personal note about standing in awe before the machine in Gotz, Technology and the Spirit, 
xiv; and his comment about finding ‘meaning in metal,’ ibid., 67.
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that spirit – a willingness to perceive spirit. Nevertheless, that spirit is also a universally 
available spirit. Anyone who desires to perceive spirit in nature will be able to have that 
experience, regardless of their religious convictions or their conceptions of spirit itself.
The Spirit of Ecology: Immanence or Transcendence?
The spirit of ecology is a spirit that inhabits nature. Often through a panentheist 
pneumatology, but sometimes as pantheist, spirit is at the interior of nature – a divine 
spark. The presence of spirit is what makes nature sacred. According to a pantheist 
theology, nature itself is God; while according to a panentheist theology, nature is in God,
but God remains outside of nature. What is common to both is that the spirit of nature is 
the Spirit of God. The main difference is whether there remains any part of the Spirit of 
God beyond the spirit of nature.
This is an important difference. If spirit is conceived of as entirely concerned with
nature, what happens to spiritual activity that is not directly connected to nature? Is work 
for social justice or personal self-improvement “spiritual”? If so, then a rationale needs to
be presented, in which the spirituality of these activities derives from the spirit of nature. 
For example, work for social justice might be conceived as “spiritual” because it 
promotes the well-being of that part of nature which is humanity. Or personal self-
improvement might be conceived as “spiritual” because it involves an awakening to one's
responsibility to care for nature. So all spirituality must derive from ecology. Yet, 
however such rationale are worked out, this framing will inevitably place limits on what 
should be considered “spiritual.”
A second issue arises, which is similar to one faced by pluralism. Is the Spirit of 
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God/nature the only spirit that exists? If the Spirit of God/nature is the only spirit that 
exists, then reality is divided into a simple dichotomy of spiritual and not-spiritual. Such 
a cosmology would need to explain how “not-spirit” can oppose the spirit of nature to the
extent of ecocide/deicide. How is it that “not-spirit” can destroy nature, if nature has 
spirit on its side? On the other hand, if there are other spirits that exist, then theological 
work needs to be done relating the Spirit of God/nature to these other spirits. Are there 
two spirits, one good, one evil, permanently at war with each other? Or are there many 
spirits which exist on a continuum of sympathy-antipathy toward the Spirit of God? From
questions such as these, we can see that the relationship of the Spirit of God to the 
existence or nonexistence of competing spirits drives the narrative of our broadest 
cosmologies.
The materiality of this spirit goes a long way toward solving the problems of 
ecological destruction, but does it do so at the cost of transcendence? The immanence of 
God is important because it enables God to participate in the world. A radical 
transcendence with no immanence situates God outside of the world, maintaining divine 
holiness and critical distance, but with no ability to influence the world. Yet a too-
immanent God participates in the world with no critical distance; God participates, but to 
what end? God suffers alongside (or within) creation, but does God have a solution to the
problem of suffering?
The Spirit of Ecology: Personal or Impersonal?
Ecological pneumatologies are somewhat ambivalent about the personality of 
spirit. Moltmann is paradigmatic on this point: he insists that spirit is a person and 
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criticizes Barth on just this point. The perichoretic unity of the Trinity is a communal 
unity among persons; spirit is not simply an energy that emanates from either the Father 
or the Son. Yet his terms for spirit are highly impersonal – spirit as the “principle of 
creativity,” as “holistic principle,” as unifying presence. These descriptors bear a striking 
resemblance to the spirit of religious pluralism.
If spirit is personal – has a will, is an agent – then the ecological spirit's 
personality seems to be expressed through macro-historical movements. The personhood 
of spirit, if it is to be more than just a dogmatic statement, is so all-encompassing that it 
can only be discerned in the broad arc of time. According to this view, the trend toward 
creativity, redemption, unity, etc., should be interpreted as more than just natural 
processes, but as the particular direction of history which derives from the particular 
personality of spirit. History is open to creativity not because creativity is “natural” but 
because spirit is creative, and spirit is personally involved in making history creative. 
This spirit bears some resemblance to the spirit of science. In the same way that the spirit 
of science is revealed in the “anthropic principle” (the bias of the universe toward life, or 
even toward human-like life), the specifics of the personality of spirit are revealed or 
experienced on the macro-historical, even cosmic, level. This conception of the 
personality of spirit, however, makes it difficult to see how an individual may have a 
personal experience of spirit except by meditatively getting “in-touch” with the universal 
essence (as with the pluralist spirit). So, spirit possesses “personhood” but is experienced 
impersonally.
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The Spirit of Ecology: A Critical and Hospitable Spirit
As we have seen above, the ecological spirit is different from the spirit of 
religious pluralism because it makes critical differentiations. Because the ecological spirit
is rooted in the particularity of the concept “nature,” it offers us criteria by which to 
judge, first and foremost, the natural vis-à-vis the unnatural. Yet, because its particularity 
is sufficiently broad, the ecological spirit is not too judgemental. Nature transgresses the 
boundaries created by human institutions, and cannot be co-opted by any particular 
group. Therefore, the judgements of the ecological spirit are not so specific that they 
support factional us-vs-them spirituality. The spirit of nature has boundaries and so is 
capable of discernment and criticism, but it is also hospitable to a great variety of 
religious expressions.
The Spirit of Ecology vis-à-vis Biblical Pneumatology
Eco-pneumatology should be credited with reminding theologians that the spirit 
of biblical traditions has significant connections to the natural world. Yet, it would be 
difficult to argue that biblical pneumatology makes a one-to-one correlation of the Spirit 
of God with the spirit of nature. Such a move would seem to amputate spirit on the 
Procrustean bed of ecology. Rather, nature is one force among many which are under the 
control of God. The connection of spirit to nature can be seen in the foundation myths of 
Genesis and the wisdom literature, especially Job. Yet, those same traditions depict the 
separation of God from nature. Indeed, according to some interpretations of the Genesis 
stories, God's involvement in nature is mediated through human beings, who are installed
as God's vice-regents in the Garden. The spirit (or breath) of God dwells in humanity 
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rather than nature-as-a-whole. Consequently, the tragedy of the destruction and misuse of
nature is intensified by the fact that it is performed by God's image-bearers, empowered 
as they are by the breath of God.
Implications for Technology: The Conversation Between the Spirit of Ecology and 
Biblical Pneumatology
If the Spirit of God in biblical pneumatology relates to nature primarily or 
exclusively through humanity as God's image-bearers, then human tool-building is an 
activity that is empowered by God. Tool-building and using is clearly not prohibited by 
the Spirit of God. And yet, not all human activity is sanctioned by God, and the use of 
tools is no different. For, in biblical pneumatology, there are many spirits which influence
human beings, and not all spirits are “of God.” Humans can use tools according to spirits 
other than God's, e.g., in the spirit of domination. It is not the tools, then, but their spirit 
that is called into question by the Spirit of God. The spirit of technique is revealed by our 
language about technique – our technology. In this situation, we must be willing to 
subordinate our technology to the grammar of the Spirit of God.
THE SPIRIT OF SOCIAL CRITICISM
So far, I have examined the spririt of science, of religious pluralism, and of 
ecology. Here I turn to my final spirit, the spirit of social criticism. In the previous 
chapter, I explored the use of spirit-language by non-religious and religion-based social 
criticism. The key works in the non-religious mode are The Spirit Level by Wilkinson and
Pickett, The Soul of Capitalism by Greider, and Shop Class as Soulcraft by Crawford. 
The key works in the religious mode are the writings on “the Powers” by Wink and 
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Stringfellow as well as the implicit pneumatology of Ellul. In this section, I draw out 
some of the implications that belong to spirit-language in social criticism, especially in its
religious mode.
When ethicists, social critics, or political philosophers refer to “spirit,” they seem 
to be referring to the characteristics, moral qualities, or attitudes belonging to physical or 
social systems. The spirit or soul of an institution represents its general disposition, its 
typical modus operandi, its driving force: those values that determine whether any 
particular course of action is “characteristic” of the institution or not. These values do not
necessarily determine the behaviour of an institution in every instance, but they heavily 
weight the likelihood of a specific behaviour.
The Spirit of Social Criticism: Subjective and Objective Experience
The identification of a spirit in social systems theory is always somewhat 
subjective, as is the experience of that spirit. For example, the characterization of a spirit 
as evil or benevolent often depends on the speaker's social location. The victim of 
exploitative labour practices is more likely to consider the spirit of capitalism to be evil 
than a corporate executive; while a supreme court justice will likely have a different 
perspective on the spirit of the law than someone who has been unfairly criminalized.
However, the spirit of social criticism also contains an objective pole. Spirit 
belongs to observable human institutions (e.g., government, family, education, the city, 
etc.) or material realities (e.g., nature, the earth, the cosmos). As a result, subjectivity is 
not complete. For any particular spirit, there is a range of descriptions which is credible, 
and a limit beyond which those descriptions fail to find purchase. Descriptions of the 
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spirit of higher education are not likely to have very much in common with descriptions 
of the spirit of Wall Street, and if the two are conflated they will both be misunderstood. 
Spirits often have overlapping domains: their boundaries are not well-defined. But each 
spirit has a distinct core or centre, which it shares with no other.
The subjective and objective experience of spirit as implied by social theory is 
significant. It avoids the irrelevance of a purely objective spirit, as understood by science,
which seems to exist merely as a theological gloss on scientifically determined facts. It 
also avoids the ambiguity of a pluralist spirit that contains all spirits and is available to 
everyone but, like the spirit of science, does nothing in particular. It incorporates the 
positive insights from an ecological spirit that is immanent within nature, but it resists the
temptation to conflate all spirits into one spirit.
The Spirit of Social Criticism: Personhood
The spirit of social systems can be conceived of as having personhood. The spirit 
of an institution refers to its character or propensity, but cannot deterministically predict 
the behaviour of that institution. This fits with what we know about persons: they behave 
in ways that are generally consistent, but are not simple or deterministically predictable 
like a scientific law. Persons are complex. For a spirit to be a person – to have a will and 
to exercise it in meaningful ways – means that it will have a general character while 
remaining free to use a variety of means to achieve its purposes.
While a social systems theory can create room to conceptualize spirit as a person, 
especially from a religious perspective such as that of Stringfellow168 and Wink,169 social 
168 Stringfellow, The Politics of Spirituality.
169 Walter Wink, Unmasking the Powers: The Invisible Forces That Determine Human Existence 
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critics and others who use a social systems analysis are generally inconsistent in their use 
of spirit-language with regard to personhood. As I discussed in chapter 3, spirit-language 
in non-religious discourse is most often used anthropomorphically to stand in for abstract 
forces which are simply not understood. Spiritual personhood is used figuratively in order
to get a handle on the social systems, but the implications of personhood do not shape the
discussion of spirit's interaction with these systems. The personhood of spirit is consistent
with the social systems theory, but often it is not used reciprocally to inform that theory. 
As a result, the analysis remains incomplete. One consequence of the failure to allow the 
personhood of spirit to inform social theory is that responses to the spirit of social 
systems tend to be overly optimistic, mechanistic, and ineffective.
The Spirit of Social Criticism: (Im)Materiality
The spirit of social systems is both material and immaterial. The existence of the 
invisible spirit is bound up in the existence of the visible institution in a symbiotic 
relationship, such that it is difficult to say which has priority. Does the spirit of capitalism
call forth the institution of capitalism, or does the spirit emerge only after the advent of 
the institution? To some extent spirit has priority, since spirit shapes the concrete forms of
the institution. Among the various avenues that exist for any given institution, spirit limits
the viability of those avenues, so that some attitudes or practices simply “do not fit” with 
the spirit of capitalism and will not be chosen. Yet the concrete forms also shape the spirit
of an institution. Putting horizontal organizational structures in place will tend to shape 
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1986); Walter Wink, When the Powers Fall: Reconciliation in the 
Healing of Nations (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998); Walter Wink, The Powers That Be: 
Theology for a New Millennium (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1999).
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the spirit of an institution in a more egalitarian direction, while hierarchical 
organizational structures produce a more stratified spirit. So, in a paradox fitting for 
spirit, it seems that the institution and its spirit mutually produce each other.
Spirit's involvement with matter is such that spirit requires visible manifestation, 
but is not found within the material elements. Its connection to matter is analogous to the 
philosophical problem of personal identity. A person continues to exist, even if they lose 
some of their physical attributes, such as a limb or hair. Yet, there are tipping points: 
eventually, the loss of these attributes significantly alters the character of the person, and 
in extreme cases the person could be said to have been displaced by another or to have 
ceased to exist altogether.
The Spirit of Social Criticism: Unity and Diversity
A social systems analysis suggests a plurality of spirits. Difference among social 
institutions is indisputable. While a pluralist pneumatology tends to reduce these 
differences to mere superficialities, which can be overcome by a greater attention to more
fundamental unity, a social systems analysis accepts these differences as real and 
significant. The differences belong to different spirits. Because of this, judgement, 
discernment, and social criticism are meaningful pursuits.
Though the differences are real and significant, they are not absolute. The 
differences among spirits can be overcome by a meaningful harmony or collaboration of 
spirits, or by a subordination of many spirits to one spirit, e.g., to the Spirit of God, the 
spirit of Love, etc. The kind of unity that is achieved in this way is different from the 
unity of pneumatological monism because it arises out of history and is the product of 
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choice and action, rather than of fate or Being.
The Spirit of Social Criticism vis-à-vis Biblical Pneumatology
Stringfellow and Wink generally use the term “Powers” when discussing social 
systems. Semantically, the Powers and spirit are not identical, though they are 
conceptually similar, and are linked textually in Ephesians 6. Spirit in biblical traditions 
is depicted as the life force or genius of individuals. So, for example, individuals have 
their own spirit, but God can also send an evil spirit upon them. One can be overcome by 
a spirit of jealousy or a spirit of stupor. One's spirit can be oppressed or revived. Spirit 
can even be passed from one person to another.
What I am calling the spirit of social systems is more closely described by the 
biblical concept of the Powers, especially as found in the New Testament. Biblical 
pneumatology places a greater emphasis on the spirit of individual beings than on the 
Powers, which appear primarily in apocalyptic passages. Generally, the Powers are more 
potent than one's spirit. One explanation for the connection between Powers and spirit 
might be that the Powers are made up of the same thing (homoousia) as an individual's 
spirit, but are more powerful because they belong to larger institutions. Another might be 
that Powers are produced by the combination of the spirits of the individuals who make 
up the social institution. Whatever the reason (which deserves an entirely different study),
it seems that both spirits and Powers are spiritual in the biblical tradition, though Biblical 
traditions generally prefer to speak about the spirit with reference to individual beings.
The explanatory power of the spirit of social systems is impressive, but it can lead
to a fatalistic-apocalyptic posture toward spiritual forces. The plurality of spirits creates 
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room for analysis and critique leading to meaningful social action, but the other-
worldliness and the scale of the Powers makes it difficult to see how individuals can have
any effect on them whatsoever. Biblical traditions complexify this discussion by 
emphasizing the spirit of individual beings. In biblical traditions, the concept of the 
Powers is attributed to social institutions, made up of groups of people, but the accent 
remains on individual, personal spirits. Even the Spirit of God is the spirit of a person.
Implications for Technology: The Conversation Between the Spirit of Social 
Criticism and Biblical Pneumatology
The accent on the individual-personal spirit in biblical traditions challenges the 
use of spirit-language in social criticism's technology. A social systems analysis would 
locate technique among the Powers, without necessarily articulating a personal response 
to technique or explaining how such a response can be effective. But a pneumatology 
such as that of the biblical traditions, which places the individual spirit in necessary 
relationship to the Powers, offers a way forward for human interaction with technique. So
a social systems analysis tends to reduce human options to the three that Barbour 
discusses, which I paraphrase as: 1) “rage against the machine;” 2) fatalistic acceptance 
or willing embrace of technique; and 3) giving oneself to political structures or other 
Powers in order to limit or influence technique.170 But spirit as described in biblical 
traditions offers further options: 4) to use one's personal-individual spirit to influence the 
Power of technique; and 5) to appeal to the Spirit of God to limit the Power of technique.
By focusing on the spiritual essence of technique, rather than its material 
170 Barbour's categories are actually ‘technology as threat,’Ethics in an Age of Technology, 2:10–15; 
‘technology as liberator,’ibid., 2:4–10; and ‘technology as instrument of power.’ ibid., 2:15–23. See also
Russell, ‘Five Attitudes Toward Nature and Technology from a Christian Perspective’.
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manifestations, the options available for human interaction with technique are shifted into
a different key. A connection emerges between personal piety, which is the focus of 
traditional religious practices, and resistance to technological determinism, which is the 
concern of social critics and activists. Often the temptation is to divorce popular piety 
from social acts of resistance and construction. Conversely, social actors such as activists,
critics, and politicians, are often exempt from criticism regarding their personal 
spirituality. So, the activist's success is determined by the depth of their analysis or by the
success of their actions, rather than by their spirit, and the devout piety of ordinary folk is
not expected to have social consequences other than perhaps to preserve the status quo. 
Yet, those who have had the most significant positive and long-lasting impact on human 
history have been those actors who have found a way to connect their inner and outer 
lives with integrity. A truly pious spirituality will then include resistance to technique-as-
Power, and resistance to technique-as-Power will include personal spirituality.
CONCLUSION
We need to speak about technique in such a way that spirit is conceptualized as a 
person who can do things. This means that we need to examine the spirit-language of 
technology for hints as to the personhood and the freedom/efficacy of spirit. If the kind of
spirit that is assumed a priori by the methods of technological discourse is not a person 
and cannot do things, then I suspect that “spirit” is simply being used as a placeholder for
our own ignorance, as a sentimental gloss on our own presuppositions, or to protect our 
political agendas from scrutiny by sanctifying them. But if the Spirit of God is a person 
who can do things, then that spirit is going to be able to question us. Perhaps that spirit 
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might even challenge our hubris – our self-congratulating theologies and our sense of 
exceptionalism vis-à-vis the Other that we meet in nature, in our neighbour, and in God.
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CONCLUSION
Technique – craft, skill, or method – is an aspect of reality that holds great 
significance for the religious life, but has received relatively little theological treatment 
historically. Because theology has failed to provide compelling myths to frame technique,
popular culture has developed its own stories. These narratives are mirrored in academic 
literature, and have been summarized as technological optimism, pessimism, and 
instrumentalism. Yet this way of summarizing the available options misses some of the 
texture which historical cultures have conveyed through mythology or religious 
cosmology. Today, social critics with a religious perspective are beginning to make up for
this lack by narrating a worldview which places appropriate limits on technique. In this, 
they would be well served by a deeper analysis of the meaning of technique in 
theological terms.
Though technique has become a more common theme in theology today, this shift
has only happened quite recently. Even now, theological treatment of technique falls into 
two main modes: describing the problems in a technological society, or imagining a 
technological future. Tillich's work is paradigmatic of the first mode, and for most of the 
twentieth century theology generally followed his impulse to describe “the spiritual 
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situation in our technical society.” The work of Teilhard de Chardin is paradigmatic of the
second mode, which actively imagines a future made possible by technique. Toward the 
end of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, this approach gained in popularity, 
and has now become the more typical mode of theological engagement with technology. 
A third option represented by Heidegger and Ellul  – to analyze the meaning of technique
– has not received as significant treatment by theology as it has by sociology and 
philosophy.
Given the lack of extensive theological investigation into the meaning of 
technique, it is difficult to know where to begin to address this third option. The methods 
of theological inquiry lend themselves more toward the study of language than of 
phenomena (as sociology might), so I approached theology as grammar, and chose to 
look at technology rather than technique itself. As an avenue into the meaning of 
technique, I surveyed the use of spirit-language in technology. In religion-and-science 
discourse, spirit is claimed as a link between the world of science and the world of 
theology. In ecological discourse, spirit inhabits nature and sacralizes it. In social 
criticism, spirit (especially the Powers) animates social institutions and the images of 
public personas. In ancient discourse on technique, spirit provides a telos for matter. In 
modern technology, Gotz sees spirit as the source of Being for all beings, while Ellul sees
the Spirit of God as the source of a particular kind of freedom and life.
The conception of spirit by religion-and-science discourse assumes materialism a 
priori, and so produces a spirit that is quasi-material and impersonal. Empiricism is the 
controlling discourse, and so an empirical world-view is absolutized. The result is not the 
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well-known conflict (misguided though it may be) between religion and science, but a 
new conflict between religion(s) and science-as-religion, or Scientism. The 
pneumatology of Scientism differs from biblical pneumatology, perhaps most 
significantly in terms of contingency and grace. Reading biblical pneumatology back into
religion-and-science produces a theological criticism of a technological conception of 
spirit as proposed by Scientism: spirit is not merely the magical ghost that makes the 
machine work (the “spirit of the gaps” or the deus ex machina). Spirit must also be a 
person whose freedom is not limited by the operations of the machine.
The conception of spirit by the religious pluralism of Gotz and Teilhard de 
Chardin is also materialist, but different from the materialism of science. Empiricism is 
an important assumption, but the controlling discourse is religious pluralism: there is an 
over-arching desire to relativize and synthesize all religious truth. Therefore, spirit is an 
indistinct Being inhabiting all matter, and in particular is that thing that all beings have in
common. This spirit lacks personality, because personality would imply distinction and 
therefore separation, and separation would be antithetical to the purpose of this spirit, 
which is to unify. This spirit is also uncritical, since there can be no criticism without first
making distinctions. Biblical pneumatology differs from religious pluralism in that the 
biblical spirit makes distinctions: there are “evil spirits” and “human spirits” and “Holy 
Spirit.” Reading biblical pneumatology back into religious pluralism produces the 
theological criticism that spirit must be conceived as multiple: not all spirit is the Spirit of
God.
The conception of spirit by ecology is materialist in yet another way: spirit 
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inhabits living matter in particular. Spirit belongs to nature rather than to manufactured 
products; therefore it is possible to speak of killing or destroying spirit. Like the spirit of 
religious pluralism, this spirit is immanent rather than transcendent. Yet because it is not 
completely universal, it is possible for spirit to make distinctions, and therefore it is 
possible for us to imagine this spirit as personal. This spirit is the spirit of Life, and we 
can imagine a personal being distinguishing between life and death and actively working 
to produce life in the universe. This spirit is capable of making distinctions, but also of 
unifying. However, the ecological concept of spirit differs from biblical pneumatology, 
which depicts the Breath of God being deposited specifically with humanity. Reading 
biblical pneumatology back into ecology produces the theological criticism that the 
Breath of God must be distinguished from the spirit of nature.
The spirit of social criticism is not a materialist spirit, but a social or institutional 
spirit, more typically called a Power. A Power belongs to objective institutions, but is 
perceived subjectively. The way the language of Powers is used in social criticism usually
implies personhood, but the personhood of Powers rarely informs the discourse. Spirit-
language in social criticism (including spirit, Power, soul) refers to a type of existence 
called spirit, to which individual spirits belong. Because some of the most significant 
work on the Powers was done by biblical scholar Walter Wink, the concept of the Powers 
is much closer to biblical pneumatology than the other conceptions of spirit. However, 
the Powers differ from biblical pneumatology by placing an emphasis on the social 
systems at the expense of the individual. The biblical witness includes the Powers, but it 
places considerably more emphasis on individual spirits. Reading biblical pneumatology 
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back into social criticism produces the theological reminder to find a relationship 
between personal spirits and institutional Powers.
The comparison of technological pneumatologies with Christian pneumatologies 
has raised several methodological issues with spirit-language. The first issue is the 
question of which Christian pneumatology to use as the standard. In this project, I have 
resolved this difficulty by appealing to some of the more uncontroversial aspects of 
biblical pneumatology. In this, I hope to have demonstrated the viability of this method to
produce meaningful positions rather than convince the reader of any particular positions. 
The second issue is the difficulty of speaking about spirit as person. Granted, not all 
technological pneumatologies (or even biblical pneumatologies) intend to conceptualize 
spirit as person. But for those that do, incorporation of personality theory from 
psychology or philosophy (or, in the case of biblical pneumatology, a study of personality
in historical philosophy) may be required in order to give the personality of the spirit 
content. The third issue is the ambiguity of the concept of freedom. Again, freedom is not
necessarily a significant concept for all technological pneumatologies, but it seems that 
freedom should at least be a part of any Christian theology. Here again, closer 
engagement with philosophical discussions of freedom may be enlightening. Finally, a 
purely grammatical difficulty: any engagement with technological pneumatologies needs 
to address the multiplicity of forms for writing “spirit,” including “spirit,” “Spirit,” “the 
Spirit,” and “Holy Spirit.” Each of these forms carries a slightly different nuance, 
complicating a direct comparison of pneumatologies.
Several avenues lay open for future discussions of the spirit of technology. I have 
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taken this project as far as reading biblical pneumatology back into technology's use of 
spirit-language. This has shown how a conversation between technology and theology 
can happen, and it has produced some critiques of technological pneumatology. However,
these critiques are merely preliminary: what is needed is a systematic comparison of 
those pneumatologies. Systematic pneumatology would proceed according to the normal 
methods of theology. Where I was limited to a few arbitrarily chosen values (materiality, 
personhood, freedom, etc.), a systematic pneumatology would compare the spirits across 
a wider spectrum of attributes.
Another direction that this work could take is to consider how Christian beliefs 
about the Spirit of God could or should change technology. This project suggests at least 
two important avenues for such a discussion: the implications of the personal Spirit of 
God on technique-as-Power, and an evaluation of the kind of control enabled by 
technique in light of the Christian’s submission to God. Does conceptualizing the Spirit 
of God and other spirits as persons affect how we speak about and interact with the spirit 
of technique in our daily lives? And what would it mean for the Power of technique to 
submit to the Holy Spirit?
Finally, a pneumatological discussion could begin to shape the broader discourse 
around technique. Biblical pneumatology encourages certain adjustments to our 
conception of the spirit(s) of technique. After making these adjustments, how would the 
new concept of spirit affect other areas of technology? At this point, we would move 
from a technological pneumatology to a pneumatological technology. Pneumatology 
would impose limits and suggest possibilities for how we understand technique in our 
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world. In this way, Christian pneumatology has the potential to influence the entire 
discourse around technique in the modern world.
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